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In 2016, Donald Trump ignited a political firestorm when he suggested that
women should be punished for having abortions. Although he backtracked, Trump’s
misstep launched a debate about whether women have been or should be punished
for having abortions. At the same time, Trump’s comments revealed that punishing
women has become far more than an abstraction. In 2016, Indiana resident Purvi
Patel became just the most recent visible example when she was sentenced to twenty
years for feticide and child neglect for inducing an abortion.
But in spite of the furor created by Trump’s comment and Patel’s conviction,
the history surrounding abortion and the punishment of women has remained
obscure. Using original archival research, this Article closes that gap, exploring the
history of pro-life debates about when, whether, and why to punish women. From
this history, a paradox emerges. Over time, the pro-life movement committed more
to a woman-protective strategy at the same time that pro-lifers justified the prosecu-
tion of women who violated laws on abortion and drug use.
If those on opposing sides of the abortion debate actually agree on the need to
protect women, this paradox should be resolved. This Article proposes several legal
steps that those on either side could take to demonstrate an interest in protecting
women. As an initial matter, both movements should eliminate vague language in
feticide laws that could apply to women having abortions and repeal any statute ex-
plicitly authorizing such punishment. As importantly, both sides should work for
alternatives to criminalization. These steps should include a campaign for additional
funding for drug treatment programs at the state and federal level and laws to check
some of the reasons that make women so desperate to terminate a pregnancy, includ-
ing domestic violence. This kind of reform campaign would ensure that the reality
and rhetoric surrounding the punishment of pregnant women finally match.
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 736
I. PUNISHMENT BEFORE AND AFTER ROE V. WADE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 740
A. Prosecuting Women Before Roe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 741
B. Roe v. Wade Leads to a Rethinking of Punishment and Abortion . . . . 746
* Stearns Weaver Miller Professor, Florida State University College of Law.
735
736 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:735
II. FETAL-ABUSE LAWS AND WOMAN-PROTECTIVE ARGUMENTS: THE NEW
CONTRADICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 753
A. Post-Akron Strategy Carries Forward a Contradiction . . . . . . . . . . . 754
B. Child-Abuse Laws and the Rise of Woman-Protective Arguments. . . . 757
III. PROVING ABORTION-RELATED HARMS AND THE PROSECUTION OF 
WOMEN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 762
A. Pro-Lifers Try to Prove that Abortion Hurts Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 763
B. Gonzales, Whole Woman’s Health, and the New Jurisprudence of
Punishment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 770
IV. MAKING GOOD ON THE COMMITMENT NOT TO PUNISH WOMEN . . . . . . . . 779
A. The Justifications for Punishing Pregnant Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 780
B. The Futility of Punishing Pregnant Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 782
C. Alternatives to Punishment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 784
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 787
INTRODUCTION
In 2016, Donald Trump ignited a political firestorm when he suggested that
women should receive “some form of punishment” for having abortions.1 Although
he immediately backtracked, Trump’s misstep launched a debate about whether
women have been or should be punished for abortion.2 Pro-lifers and feminists alike
denounced the idea of penalizing women.3 At the same time, Trump’s comments
1 See Tessa Berenson, Donald Trump Backs ‘Punishment’ for Women Who Get Abortions,
Then Backtracks, TIME (Mar. 30, 2016, 5:44 PM), http://time.com/4276862/donald-trump
-abortion-ban-punishment/ [https://perma.cc/F2VT-LCJ3]; Matt Flegenheimer & Maggie
Haberman, Donald Trump, Abortion Foe, Eyes ‘Punishment’ for Women, Then Recants, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 30, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2ktWd0O; Jessica Glenza, Donald Trump Retracts
Call for Women Who Have Abortions to Be ‘Punished,’ GUARDIAN (Mar. 31, 2016, 2:29 EDT),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/mar/30/donald-trump-women-abortions-pun
ishment [https://perma.cc/UTF2-SAWS].
2 For a sample of the debate on the subject, see Rachel M. Cohen, The Conviction of
Purvi Patel and the Criminalization of Abortion, AM. PROSPECT (May 25, 2016), http://pros
pect.org/article/conviction-purvi-patel-and-criminalization-abortion [https://perma.cc/6BSE
-AYAB]; William Saletan, The Pro-Life Case for Murder, SLATE (Apr. 5, 2016, 11:07 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2016/04/donald_trump_abortion
_comments_exposed_the_incoherence_of_the_anti_abortion.html [https://perma.cc/D8PB
-V85V]; Robert Schlesinger, Opinion, How Trump Was Trapped by Logic, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Mar. 31, 2016, 4:45 PM), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/robert
-schlesinger/articles/2016-03-31/donald-trump-was-trapped-by-pro-lifers-anti-abortion-logic.
3 For a sample of statements condemning Trump’s comment, see Press Release, March
for Life, No Pro-Life American Advocates Punishment for Abortion (Mar. 30, 2016), http://
www.marchforlife.org/no-pro-life-american/ [https://perma.cc/MS4H-QQTW]; Brittney Cooper,
The Pro-Life Movement’s Disingenuous Response to Trump’s Controversial Abortion Remarks,
COSMOPOLITAN (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.cosmopolitan.com/politics/a56072/pro-life-move
ment-trump-punish-women-abortion/ [https://perma.cc/8YHA-XU24]; Saletan, supra note 2.
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revealed that punishing women has become far more than an abstraction.4 In 2016,
Indiana resident Purvi Patel became just the most recent visible example when she was
sentenced to twenty years for feticide and child neglect for inducing an abortion.5
But in spite of the furor created by Trump’s comment and Patel’s conviction,
the history surrounding abortion and the punishment of women has remained ob-
scure. While some historians have documented patterns of prosecution when abortion
was a crime, current studies offer little insight into the aims of the pro-life legal
reform movement from 1973 to the present.6 Trump’s election makes the reexamina-
tion of this history both timely and significant. Are cases like Patel’s rare, or would
women and abortion providers face punishment if abortion were once again a crime?
Using original archival research, this Article explores the history of pro-life de-
bates about when, whether, and why to punish women. Starting in the 1970s, movement
members prioritized a fetal-protective constitutional amendment designed to maxi-
mize protection for the unborn child.7 Without directly discussing the punishment
of women, movement members tried to maximize protection for the unborn child
and did not rule out penalties for women who terminated their pregnancies.8 By the
mid-1980s, the movement’s focus had changed; in this period, pro-lifers pushed
restrictions designed to undercut popular approval of abortion, including stigmatizing
4 On the punishment of women for illegal abortion today, see, for example, Andrea
Rowan, Prosecuting Women for Self-Inducing Abortion: Counterproductive and Lacking
Compassion, 18 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 70, 70–74 (2015).
5 On Patel’s case, see, for example, Pooja Mehta, The Medical Community Must Come
to the Defense of Purvi Patel, HUFFPOST (May 26, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.huffington
post.com/pooja-mehta/purvi-patel-feticide-womens-health_b_10142974.html [https://perma
.cc/WY7P-JX5X]; Lynn M. Paltrow, Purvi Patel, Abortion, and the Feticide Playbook,
HUFFPOST: THE BLOG (May 27, 2016, 12:09 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/lynn-m
-paltrow/purvi-patel-abortion-and_b_10165284.html [https://perma.cc/86HP-9SSQ]; Molly
Redden, Purvi Patel’s Lawyers Appeal 20-Year Sentence Over Induced Abortion, GUARDIAN
(May 23, 2016, 16:40 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/23/purvi-patel
-appeal-abortion-sentence-feticide [https://perma.cc/TW83-G9SD].
6 For a sample of the historical scholarship on abortion before 1973, see, for example,
JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY (2006); BEFORE
ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S
RULING (Linda Greenhouse & Reva Siegel eds., 2010) [hereinafter BEFORE ROE V. WADE];
JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY,
1800–1900 (1978); LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE,
AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, 1867–1973 (1997).
7 See, e.g., DANIEL K. WILLIAMS, DEFENDERS OF THE UNBORN: THE PRO-LIFE MOVEMENT
BEFORE ROE V. WADE 212–16 (2016).
8 See id.; Mary Ziegler, Everyone Agrees Women Who Have Abortions Shouldn’t Be Pe-
nalized. Or Do They?, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/post
everything/wp/2016/04/01/everyone-agrees-women-who-have-abortions-shouldnt-be
-penalized-or-do-they/?utm_term=.3f2c0de4a6e6 [https://perma.cc/F6W9-CXFF] (describing,
in part, the anti-abortion movement’s interest in penalizing women who received abortions).
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laws outlawing abortions chosen as a method of birth control.9 At the same time,
movement leaders campaigned for the extension of homicide, child abuse, and child
neglect laws to unborn children.10 This strategy included an effort to punish pregnant
drug users and even women who self-induced abortions.11
Ironically, pro-lifers in the period also began more often presenting their cause
as an effort to protect women, not punish them.12 In the following decades, as woman-
protective laws gained favor, pro-lifers consistently emphasized that they would never
punish women if abortion were a crime.13
From this history, a paradox emerges. The movement’s commitment to protecting
women increasingly stood in tension with the way activists dealt with the prosecutions
of women who violated laws on abortion and drug use or self-induced abortion.
There is a gap between the rhetoric of abortion opponents—describing women as
victims of abortion—and the willingness of abortion opponents to sign off on the
prosecutions of women for related conduct.
If those on opposing sides of the abortion debate actually agree on the need to pro-
tect women, this paradox should be resolved. This Article proposes several legal steps
that those on either side could take to demonstrate an interest in protecting women.
As an initial matter, both movements should eliminate vague language in feticide
laws that could apply to women having abortions and repeal any statute explicitly
authorizing such punishment. As importantly, both sides should work for alternatives
to criminalization. These steps should include a campaign for additional funding for
drug treatment programs at the state and federal level, particularly those that include
child care, training for nurses and other medical staff to recognize the signs of ad-
diction, and laws to check some of the reasons that make women so desperate to
terminate a pregnancy, including domestic violence. This kind of reform campaign
would ensure that the reality and rhetoric surrounding the punishment of pregnant
women finally match.
9 See Burke Balch, NRLC Proposes a Post-Webster State Legislative Program, NAT’L
RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Oct. 19, 1989, at 6; see also MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST
HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE 29–30, 58–60 (2015) (discussing shifts in the tactics of
anti-abortion activists in the 1980s); Ziegler, supra note 8.
10 See Ziegler, supra note 8.
11 See id.
12 See ZIEGLER, supra note 9, at 169–75 (discussing both the pro-life and pro-choice
movements’ move towards arguments emphasizing the protection of women); Ziegler, supra
note 8; see also Mary Ellen Jensen, Speech at the Legislators Educational Conference: How
Public Opinion Polls Should Guide Pro-Life Strategy (Aug. 1991) (on file at Papers of
Mildred Jefferson, Box 13, Folder 6, Schlesinger Library, Harvard University); Laurie Ann
Ramsey, How Public Opinion Polls Should Guide Pro-Life Strategy (1991) (on file at Papers
of Mildred Jefferson, Box 13, Folder 8, Schlesinger Library, Harvard University).
13 See J.C. Willke, The Woman Should Not Be Punished, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS,
June 6, 1989, at 3 [hereinafter Willke, The Woman Should Not Be Punished ]; J.C. Willke,
Letter to the Editor, Never the Mother, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1988, at E22 [hereinafter Willke,
Never the Mother]; Ziegler, supra note 8.
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The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I begins by briefly canvassing the history
of criminal abortion laws before Roe v. Wade.14 Part I then explores the proposals
set forth by abortion opponents in the immediate aftermath of Roe. In the 1970s,
movement members rarely discussed the punishment of women, at least not directly.15
However, the constitutional proposals set out by movement members generally
assumed that the unborn would not be protected until the law did something about
the decisions of non-state actors, including women.16 Without directly endorsing the
punishment of women, movement leaders did not rule it out and often described
women and physicians as murderers.17
Part II describes the changes that took place in the mid-1980s. In this period,
pro-lifers pursued two sometimes conflicting strategies. On the one hand, movement
members invested in woman-protective arguments.18 Pro-lifers sponsored post-
abortion support groups and crisis pregnancy centers, and movement members used
injuries to women as a rationale for restricting abortion.19 On the other hand, move-
ment members promoted laws suggesting that some pregnant women deserved
punishment.20 Thus, as movement leaders called for the prosecution of pregnant
women for drug use, woman-protective arguments fell into question.
Part III brings the story from the late 1980s to the present. As the Supreme
Court has narrowed abortion rights, pro-lifers have relied more than ever on woman-
protective arguments.21 In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
14 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see discussion infra Part I.
15 See discussion infra Part I; Ziegler, supra note 8.
16 See discussion infra Part I; see, e.g., Memorandum from D. J. Horan, Legal Advisory
Comm., NRLC, to the Pub. Policy Comm., NRLC (Sept. 5, 1973) (on file with Gerald R. Ford
Presidential Library) (outlining, in part, concerns that a constitutional amendment restricting
abortion would not prohibit privately performed abortions).
17 See discussion infra Part I; Ziegler, supra note 8.
18 See ZIEGLER, supra note 9, at 169–75 (discussing both the pro-life and pro-choice move-
ments’ moves towards emphasizing the protection of women); Ziegler, supra note 8. See
generally also Jensen, supra note 12; Ramsey, supra note 12.
19 See SARA DIAMOND, SPIRITUAL WARFARE: THE POLITICS OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT 97
(1989) (explaining the founding of Women Exploited by Abortion (WEBA), a support group
for women who had abortions); ELLIE LEE, ABORTION, MOTHERHOOD, AND MENTAL HEALTH:
MEDICALIZING REPRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN 22–24 (2003)
(describing various pro-life support groups and mental health centers that viewed abortion
as damaging to women’s health).
20 See, e.g., Marney Rich, A Question of Rights: Birth and Death Decisions Put Women
in the Middle of Legal Conflict, CHI. TRI., Sept. 18, 1988, at F1 (describing an AUL attorney’s
support for prosecution of women for “willful” or “malicious” harm to unborn children);
Ziegler, supra note 8; Newsletter, NRLC STATEHOUSE UPDATE (Nat’l Right to Life Comm.,
Washington, D.C.), Aug. 12, 1983, at 1–6 [hereinafter STATEHOUSE UPDATE] (discussing
potential legislative actions against wrongful birth suits).
21 See Willke, Never the Mother, supra note 13; Minutes of Board Meeting: Saturday,
April 24, 1993, Ams. United for Life (on file at Papers of Mildred Jefferson, Box 13, Folder
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Casey22 and Gonzales v. Carhart,23 the Court seemed receptive to these arguments,
and pro-lifers made them more prominent.24 Although the Court’s recent decision
in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt25 made it harder for states to claim to protect
women from the supposed adverse effects of abortion, the impact of the case on the
debate about punishing women seems unclear.26 On the one hand, Whole Woman’s
Health might give second thoughts to lawmakers who have considered following
those states that have introduced new laws or interpreted old ones to allow the pros-
ecution of pregnant drug users and women having illegal abortions.27 On the other
hand, the Court’s decision makes woman-protective arguments less strategically
advantageous, ensuring that pro-lifers who wish to prosecute women for behavior
during pregnancy have less to lose.28 Part IV proposes legal alternatives to the status
quo,29 and Part V briefly concludes.30
I. PUNISHMENT BEFORE AND AFTER ROE V. WADE
Before 1973, abortion was a crime, and some state laws did at least technically
authorize the prosecution of women for solicitation, conspiracy, or accomplice
liability.31 In practice, few women went to prison for having an abortion, although
many faced embarrassment and stigma during the very public prosecution of doctors
or lovers.32 Instead, as this Part shows, prosecutors, members of law enforcement,
8, Schlesinger Library, Harvard University) [hereinafter Minutes of Board Meeting (Apr. 24,
1993)] (recording a shift in emphasis to harm to the mother).
22 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
23 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
24 See, e.g., Minutes of Board Meeting (Apr. 24, 1993), supra note 21, at 3.
25 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
26 See, e.g., Camila Domonoske, Supreme Court Strikes Down Abortion Restrictions in
Texas, NPR (June 27, 2016, 10:12 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/06
/27/483686616/supreme-court-strikes-down-abortion-restrictions-in-texas [https://perma.cc
/Z5U7-DAKF].
27 See generally Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. 2292; see also discussion infra
Section III.B.
28 See generally Domonoske, supra note 26 (indicating that it will be harder to make
women’s protection arguments).
29 See discussion infra Section IV.C.
30 See discussion infra Part V.
31 For examples of solicitation laws, see, for example, OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 862 (1971),
invalidated by Henrie v. Derryberry, 358 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Okla. 1973); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 22-17-2 (1967) (repealed 1976). On conspiracy laws covering abortion, see, for example,
People v. Stone, 202 P.2d 333, 339–42 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949), and Williams v. State, 182
P. 718, 719, 723–25 (Okla. Crim. App. 1919). On laws regarding accomplice liability for
abortion, see Wandell v. State, 25 S.W. 27, 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1894), and People v. Vedder,
98 N.Y. 630, 630–32 (1885). See also Ziegler, supra note 8.
32 See, e.g., REAGAN, supra note 6, at 23–28, 115, 123–27.
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and the press framed women as victims, duped into both sexual relationships and
abortion.33 These cases drew heavily on sex stereotypes about women’s interest in
sex and ability to operate competently outside the home.34
Although the pro-life movement organized well before 1973, the Roe decision
prompted the movement to nationalize and intensify its discussion of strategy.35
Movement leaders prioritized a constitutional amendment designed to reinstate the
right to life many felt had been lost.36 In the following decade, activists’ discussion of
the ideal amendment revealed how open the question of punishing women remained.
This Part begins by exploring the image of women at the center of pre-Roe pros-
ecutions of women. Starting with an analysis of the campaign to criminalize abor-
tion, this Part next illuminates the contradictory ideas of women that emerged after
abortion was a crime. While insisting that women were victims of abortion, some
states also held open the possibility that they should face punishment for terminating
a pregnancy. This Part then turns to the legal proposals of the pro-life movement in
the immediate aftermath of Roe. While movement members did not focus on whether
to punish women, they seemed open to any measure that would restrict abortion and
protect fetal life. The possibility of punishing women was never out of reach.
A. Prosecuting Women Before Roe
Until the mid-nineteenth century, abortion was not a crime early in pregnancy.37
In the 1700s and early 1800s, abortion was generally legal until quickening, the point
at which fetal movement could be detected (usually in the fourth month of pregnancy).38
The legal status quo came into question after 1840, when the nation’s abortion rate
spiked dramatically.39 By 1920, some estimated that twenty percent of all pregnancies
ended in abortion.40 The increase from 1840 came mostly among married, Protestant,
adult women.41
The uptick in abortions helped to inspire a campaign led by physicians and the
American Medical Association (AMA) to expand criminal prohibitions on the
33 See, e.g., id. at 23, 115, 125.
34 See, e.g., id.; MOHR, supra note 6, at 114; Supreme Court Finds No Error, SUNDAY
HERALD, Jan. 10, 1904, at 12 (writing that the events surrounding Ida Lafferty’s attempted
abortion was the story of a “pitiful” girl wronged by a male protector).
35 See discussion infra Section I.B.
36 See WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 212–13; ZIEGLER, supra note 9, at xv, 2, 38–44.
37 See JANET FARRELL BRODIE, CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA 253–54 (1994); MOHR, supra note 6, at 43; REAGAN, supra note 6, at 8.
38 See, e.g., MOHR, supra note 6, at 3–6, 163–64; MARVIN OLASKY, ABORTION RITES: A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF ABORTION IN AMERICA 85, 123–25 (1992); REAGAN, supra note 6, at 9.
39 See, e.g., MOHR, supra note 6, at 46, 52–53, 59, 119.
40 See, e.g., REAGAN, supra note 6, at 23.
41 See, e.g., id. at 10.
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procedure.42 The purposes of this effort were complex. In part, AMA members like
Horatio Storer reacted to increasing competition from midwives and other alterna-
tive practitioners.43 Campaigning against abortion allowed physicians to display
what they framed as superior knowledge of fetal life and a better understanding of
the morality of abortion.44
While doctors had many reasons for fighting to ban abortions, the physician-led
campaign developed contradictory ideas about women who terminated their preg-
nancies, describing them both as selfish killers and victims of unscrupulous men.
Some doctors blamed higher abortion rates on selfish, economically secure women
who no longer accepted conventional roles.45 Writing in 1868, Dr. Montrose Pallen
wrote: “[T]he woman who has been well educated, who occupies high stations in
society, . . . whose character has not been impugned, will deliberately resort to any
and every measure which may effectually destroy her unborn offspring.”46
At other times, the physician campaigners also described women as victims of
self-serving men who demanded abortions. “When the reformation begins in ear-
nest,” wrote John Trader, a Missouri physician in 1874, “it must begin with us men
who have been the aggressors, who in every age have first suggested the crime, and
who in every age have compelled the execution of it.”47 Trader’s statement brought
to the surface the contradictory ideas of women at the heart of the campaign to ban
abortion in the mid-nineteenth century. Physician-campaigners demonized women
who chose abortion for “selfish and personal ends” while swearing off their duties
as mothers.48 At the same time, these activists reaffirmed that “normal” women sought
out neither sex nor abortion.49 Men were the “aggressors” and the ones with the
competence to locate and pay for an abortion.50
In spite of the contradictions in their portrayal of women, physicians seeking to ban
abortion had tremendous success; by the mid-nineteenth century, state laws criminal-
ized abortion under all but a handful of circumstances.51 Nevertheless, the application
42 See, e.g., KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 24, 28–31
(1984); MOHR, supra note 6, at 147–70; OLASKY, supra note 38, at 109–28.
43 See, e.g., LUKER, supra note 42, at 20–21; REAGAN, supra note 6, at 10–12; LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 30–31 (1990).
44 See, e.g., LUKER, supra note 42, at 20–23; REAGAN, supra note 6, at 10–12.
45 See MOHR, supra note 6, at 104–05; REAGAN, supra note 6, at 13.
46 MOHR, supra note 6, at 104 (quoting Montrose A. Pallen, Foeticide, or Criminal Abor-
tion, 3 MED. ARCHIVES 193, 202 (1869)).
47 Id. at 114 (quoting John W. Trader, Criminal Abortion, 11 ST. LOUIS MED. & SUR-
GICAL J. 575, 588 (1874)).
48 Id. at 108.
49 Cf. id. at 86–90, 108 (discussing anti-abortion physicians’ concern over women’s “self-
indulgence” and eschewing of traditional roles).
50 See id. at 86–90, 108, 114.
51 See ROSEMARY NOSSIFF, BEFORE ROE: ABORTION POLICY IN THE STATES 31–34
(2001); REAGAN, supra note 6, at 5, 13.
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of these laws remained unpredictable; physicians disagreed about when therapeutic
exceptions to abortion bans should apply, as did members of law enforcement.52
When (and whether) prosecutors should focus on women also remained up in
the air. In practice, women might have experienced the publicity, interrogations, and
extensive trials as punishment.53 The trials themselves also exposed contradictions
in the images of women written into the law. Courts and legislators repeated that
women who had abortions were victims.54 At the same time, many women knew that
they could theoretically face criminal charges; the law sent conflicting messages
about women who chose abortion, simultaneously denouncing and pitying them.55
Consider the story of Ida Lafferty, a nineteen-year-old who made headlines in the
first years of the twentieth century.56 In Lafferty’s native Connecticut, the media ate
up what it called “a pitiful story of a girl wronged by a man whom she thought was her
only protector.”57 Coverage of the trial made clear how much prosecutors and members
of the public conflated the crimes of abortion and seduction; written into criminal
laws or treated as a tort, many states penalized seduction, a crime reaching sex obtained
by misrepresentation, lies, or fraud.58 Lafferty had been seeing a man, Michael Carey,
who allegedly seduced her with promises of marriage.59 When Lafferty learned she
was pregnant, Carey refused to marry her.60 Instead, he took her to a hotel room,
where Marion Beebe unsuccessfully attempted to perform an abortion.61 Prosecutors
cut a deal with Beebe and Lafferty and relied on them in their prosecution of Carey.62
At trial and on appeal, Lafferty’s culpability took center stage, but the ambiguity
of her position soon became impossible to miss.63 In some ways, reporters portrayed
52 See DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, INTENDED CONSEQUENCES: BIRTH CONTROL, ABORTION,
AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN MODERN AMERICA 133 (1999); LUKER, supra note 42,
at 47–50, 56–58; REAGAN, supra note 6, at 4–13.
53 See, e.g., REAGAN, supra note 6, at 115, 125.
54 See, e.g., MOHR, supra note 6, at 136–38 (describing state legislation which permitted
women to obtain “immunities” for receiving an abortion, and instead punished individuals
who facilitated abortions); REAGAN, supra note 6, at 23, 116–18 (highlighting prosecutors’
focus on cases where women were “victim[s]” who had died from abortion procedures).
55 See, e.g., MOHR, supra note 6, at 140, 201; REAGAN, supra note 6, at 13, 23, 116–18;
see also supra notes 42–54 and accompanying text.
56 On Lafferty’s story, see State v. Carey, 56 A. 632, 633–37 (Conn. 1904); Supreme
Court Finds No Error, supra note 34.
57 Supreme Court Finds No Error, supra note 34.
58 See, e.g., Brian Donovan, Gender Inequality and Criminal Seduction: Prosecuting
Sexual Coercion in the Early-20th Century, 30 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 61, 64–67 (2005); Melissa
Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17–19 (2012); Supreme Court
Finds No Error, supra note 34.
59 See Supreme Court Finds No Error, supra note 34.
60 See id.
61 See id.; State v. Carey, 56 A. 632, 633–34 (Conn. 1904).
62 See Supreme Court Finds No Error, supra note 34; Carey, 56 A. at 633.
63 See Supreme Court Finds No Error, supra note 34; Carey, 56 A. at 633.
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Lafferty as an innocent victim, a woman who wanted nothing more than marriage
and children.64 During the trial, reporters claimed that Carey could free himself of
legal trouble if he agreed to marry Lafferty and “save the stigma that will attach to her
unborn child.”65 Carey emphasized that she was anything but innocent.66 Lafferty
“knew other fellows,” one of whom might have caused her “delicate condition.”67
Whether Lafferty herself was a criminal remained unclear after Carey’s convic-
tion; following his conviction, Carey appealed, challenging the trial court’s instruc-
tions on witness credibility.68 The trial judge had told jurors that they could hold
doubts about Lafferty’s credibility because she had violated several laws, including
those on fornication and abortion.69 Nevertheless, the judge informed the jury that
Lafferty was not an accomplice.70
On appeal, Carey argued that Lafferty’s legal status was far more complex than
the trial judge had suggested.71 The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut rejected
his argument, clarifying that women were victims of abortion.72 As the Court ex-
plained, “[t]he public policy which underlies this legislation is based largely on
protection due to the woman—protection against her own weakness as well as the
criminal lust and greed of others.”73 In this way, the court reinforced a narrative that
described women as sexless and led to abortion because of the wrongdoing of others.
In practice, Lafferty’s position was far more complex. While she was never
prosecuted, the law authorized charges that would have shaped her conduct; in fact,
Connecticut had recently amended its abortion laws to create a separate offense for
women who “attempt[ed] to produce unnecessary miscarriage, whether through the
use of her own hands or those of an agent.”74 While women were victims of abor-
tion, they could still be considered criminals.75 Other states resolved the question in
similar ways: indeed, more than one-third of states criminalized the actions of women
who terminated their own pregnancies or asked others to do so.76




68 See Carey, 56 A. at 633–34.
69 See id.
70 See id.
71 See id. at 635.
72 See id. at 635–36.
73 Id. at 636.
74 Id.
75 See id. (distinguishing the offenses of women self-inducing miscarriages and men
facilitating or performing the abortion).
76 See Paul Benjamin Linton, The Legal Status of Abortion in the States if Roe v. Wade
Is Overruled, 23 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 6 n.15 (2007). A handful of states signed off on the
prosecution of women for self-inducing an abortion. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Weible, 45
Pa. Super. 207, 208, 210 (1911); Crissman v. State, 245 S.W. 438, 438–39 (Tex. Crim. App.
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Women continued to find themselves in a contradictory legal position for decades
after Lafferty’s case. In the 1930s, abortion rates climbed in the face of the Great De-
pression.77 More physicians began viewing economic issues as a valid consideration
in the analysis of therapeutic abortion.78 Hospitals expanded their abortion practices,
and some freestanding abortion clinics emerged.79
The growing legitimacy of medical abortion sparked a crackdown.80 Prosecutors
turned from targeting “seducers” like Michael Carey or doctors who killed or injured
women during a procedure, instead going after physicians with established prac-
tices.81 Prosecutors also brought women into much deeper contact with the criminal
justice system, making clear the contradiction in laws that treated them as both
victims and perpetrators.82
Contradictory images of women’s role in abortion were impossible to miss in
the 1940s and 1950s. In 1910, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that a woman
could not be prosecuted for her own abortion,83 but in the mid-1950s, a woman facing
similar charges could not convince a court to dismiss charges against her.84 In the
late 1950s, Barbara Ann Snyder arrived at a Pennsylvania hospital because of com-
plications she suffered after an illegal abortion.85 During the prosecution against the
doctor who performed her abortion, Snyder refused to testify and was jailed on con-
tempt charges.86 Her reasons for not testifying were likely several: in addition to the
stigma of a trial, she recognized that other prosecutors had the authority to bring
conspiracy charges against her for seeking an abortion.87
Snyder appealed her contempt conviction, and the Superior Court of Pennsylva-
nia affirmed.88 “[I]t is well settled in this Commonwealth that a woman who submits
1922). Some states explicitly did punish women who self-induced abortion. See, e.g., People
v. Caffey, 119 P. 901, 906 (Cal. 1911) (“But if a woman voluntarily solicits the performance
of such an operation upon herself and to that extent induces it, it is impossible to see how she
can fail to have been an instigator and encourager of the crime, and so an accomplice.”).
77 See, e.g., REAGAN, supra note 6, at 132; JODI VANDENBERG-DAVES, MODERN MOTHER-
HOOD: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 202 (2014); WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 20.
78 See, e.g., REAGAN, supra note 6, at 132–33 (describing physicians’ consideration of social
circumstances such as the Great Depression); VANDENBERG-DAVES, supra note 77, at 202.
79 See REAGAN, supra note 6, at 133; WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 20–21.
80 See REAGAN, supra note 6, at 160–73; KAREN WEINGARTEN, ABORTION IN THE AMER-
ICAN IMAGINATION: BEFORE LIFE AND CHOICE, 1880–1940, at 140 (2014); Leslie J. Reagan,
Crossing the Border for Abortions: California Activists, Mexican Clinics, and the Creation
of a Feminist Health Agency in the 1960s, in WOMEN, HEALTH, AND NATION: CANADA AND
THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1945, at 355, 360 (Georgina Feldberg et al. eds., 2003).
81 See REAGAN, supra note 6, at 160–67.
82 See, e.g., id. at 116, 132–33, 160–67.
83 See Commonwealth v. Weible, 45 Pa. Super. 207, 208–10 (1911).
84 See Commonwealth v. Hauze, 4 Pa. D. & C.2d 61, 62–65 (1955).
85 See Commonwealth v. Fisher, 149 A.2d 666, 667 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1959).
86 See id.
87 See id. at 667–69.
88 See id. at 669.
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herself to a doctor to have an abortion performed is not an accomplice,” the court
explained.89 “She is regarded rather as a victim.”90 Even though Snyder could have
been prosecuted for fornication if she had testified, the court concluded that she should
still face contempt charges for refusing to testify.91 Although Snyder still was formally
considered a victim, she faced punishment herself when she failed to cooperate with
the state.92
After Roe legalized abortion, the question of who should be punished for abortion
never faded from view; pro-lifers mobilized to promote a constitutional amendment
outlawing abortion.93 As some proposals made their way before Congress, movement
members engaged in an intense debate about what an ideal solution would involve.94
These discussions did not center on the issue of punishing women; nonetheless,
movement members did not rule out anything that would limit abortion, and women’s
status if abortion were made illegal remained uncertain.95
B. Roe v. Wade Leads to a Rethinking of Punishment and Abortion
The movement to reform or repeal criminal laws on abortion picked up momen-
tum in the 1960s when Colorado became the first state to adopt the American Law
Institute’s model abortion-reform statute.96 By 1973, over a dozen states had passed
similar legislation, and a handful repealed all criminal abortion restrictions.97 In coun-
tering this campaign, as Part I shows, the early anti-abortion movement rarely
discussed the punishment of women.
The anti-abortion movement of the twentieth century began within the Catholic
Church in the 1930s.98 Concerned about the spread and improvement of contraceptive
technology, the Church launched a campaign against contraception and abortion,




92 See id. (concluding that women who submit to abortions are considered victims, but
upholding the conviction of a woman for refusing, at trial, to testify regarding her abortion).
93 WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 212–16; ZIEGLER, supra note 9, at xv, 2, 38–44.
94 See discussion infra Section I.B.
95 See Rich, supra note 20; STATEHOUSE UPDATE, supra note 20, at 1–6; Ziegler, supra
note 8.
96 See DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE
MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 323–25 (1994); LUKER, supra note 42, at 41, 143.
97 BEFORE ROE V. WADE, supra note 6, at 121; NOSSIFF, supra note 51, at 41.
98 GENE BURNS, THE MORAL VETO: FRAMING CONTRACEPTION, ABORTION, AND CUL-
TURAL PLURALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 106–09, 129–49 (2005) (discussing Catholic
involvement in the early Twentieth Century anti-abortion movement); WILLIAMS, supra note
7, at 10–20, 58.
99 See, e.g., BURNS, supra note 98, at 129–49; WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 20, 58–62.
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the Catholic Church.100 In the mid-twentieth century, approval of contraception grew,
even among Catholics, and a strategy linking abortion to opposition to birth control
faltered.101 In the 1960s, movement leaders put more of an emphasis on constitu-
tional arguments for a right to life rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment.102 Pro-lifers
had their greatest successes on the state level, and the largest organizations in the
early 1970s drew their leadership from state struggles.103
Rather than worrying about the victimization of women, movement members
emphasized that science and the common law had irrefutably established the person-
hood of the fetus.104 Citing rights in property and tort law, Martin F. McKernan, Jr., an
attorney for the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC), the largest national anti-
abortion organization, asserted that “[a]ll in all, the law has consistently established cer-
tain procedural safeguards around fundamental rights to which the unborn was
entitled.”105 Americans United for Life (AUL), a group that would later lead the move-
ment’s litigation efforts, insisted that the movement could win the abortion wars by
educating the public about fetal life.106 As the organization explained in a fundraising
letter: “[I]f the American public at large can be educated [about] . . . abortion—what it
really is—what really is done to . . . the child in the womb, they will reject abortion.”107
After 1973, movement members fixated on a constitutional amendment that
would not only overrule Roe but also ban abortion across the country.108 In the mid-
1970s, leading movement lawyers and activists discussed the details of an ideal
fetal-protective amendment.109 These discussions never squarely addressed the
punishment of women, but for many in the movement, the key was to protect fetal
life as much as possible.110
100 See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 10–28, 58 (describing heavy Catholic involve-
ment in anti-abortion and contraception activities, with members of other denominations
mostly staying away from the debate).
101 See, e.g., id. at 58–62.
102 See, e.g., David W. Louisell, Abortion, the Practice of Medicine and the Due Process
of Law, 16 UCLA L. REV. 233, 234–37, 250–54 (1969); A. James Quinn & James A. Griffin,
The Rights of the Unborn, 31 JURIST 577, 578–80 (1971); Thomas L. Shaffer, Abortion, the
Law and Human Life, 2 VAL. U. L. REV. 94, 106 (1967); Note, The Unborn Child and the
Constitutional Conception of Life, 56 IOWA L. REV. 994, 996–1003 (1971).
103 See, e.g., ZIEGLER, supra note 9, at 30–33, 40–41.
104 See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, Originalism Talk: A Legal History, 2014 B.Y.U. L. REV. 869,
870–71.
105 Martin F. McKernan, Jr., Legal Report: Court Cases 4 (July 1970) (on file at American
Citizens Concerned for Life Records, Box 4, Gerald Ford Presidential Library).
106 See ZIEGLER, supra note 9, at 33.
107 Id. (quoting Americans United for Life Fundraising Letter (Sept. 20, 1972) (on file at
Americans United for Life, Executive Box File, Folder 91)).
108 See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 212–16; ZIEGLER, supra note 9, at xv, 2, 38–44.
109 See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 213–15; ZIEGLER, supra note 9, at 39–43.
110 See, e.g., ZIEGLER, supra note 9, at 38–44.
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In 1973, pro-life members of Congress had already proposed several fetal-
protective amendments.111 The Hogan Amendment extended due process and equal
protection guarantees “from the moment of conception.”112 The Buckley Amend-
ment instead clarified that the word “person” included in the Fourteenth Amendment
included fetal life.113 Representative G. William Whitehurst (R-VA) proposed what
movement members called a “permissive” amendment, allowing Congress and the
states to prohibit abortion without requiring them to do so.114
Movement members saw something wrong with each of these proposals. The
Whitehurst Amendment said nothing about fetal rights,115 and the Buckley and Hogan
Amendments seemed only to reach the actions of state actors.116 Dissatisfied by the
existing options, movement members began offering ideas of their own, including
model laws that could apply once a constitutional amendment had been ratified.117
The possibility of punishing women came into view when movement leaders
began developing what they saw as a more ideal constitutional proposal. To be sure,
movement members were particularly disturbed by the actions of doctors, and in July
1973, NRLC passed a resolution describing the “primary task of the medical profes-
sion” as the duty “to preserve human life.”118 But by July 1973, movement attorneys
began proposing their own amendments, shedding light on the ambiguity of the move-
ment’s position on the punishment for women.119 Joseph Witherspoon, a law professor
at the University of Texas, worried that both the Hogan and Buckley Amendments pro-
hibited only state action, doing nothing to “operate upon the private action of physicians
111 See id. at 42.
112 See, e.g., Human Life Amendments: Major Texts, HUM. LIFE ACTION 1, 3, https://www
.humanlifeaction.org/sites/default/files/HLAmajortexts.pdf [https://perma.cc/X92N-M2HL]
(last visited Feb. 21, 2018) [hereinafter Human Life Amendments].
113 See id. at 1.
114 See id. at 6; see also ZIEGLER, supra note 9, at 42, 86.
115 See ZIEGLER, supra note 9, at 42 (noting a pro-life academic’s concession that
“Whitehurst’s approach could result in the ‘liberalization of abortion’ or ‘its entire decriminali-
zation.’”); see also Human Life Amendments, supra note 112, at 1, 3, 6.
116 See, e.g., Memorandum from Nellie J. Gray to NRLC Bd. of Dirs. 7–8 (Sept. 24, 1973)
(on file at American Citizens Concerned for Life Records, Box 4, Gerald Ford Presidential
Library) [hereinafter Gray to NRLC Bd. of Dirs.]; Memorandum from Dennis J. Horan,
Chairman, Legal Advisory Comm., Nat’l Right to Life Comm. to NRLC Bd. of Dirs. 2 (Jan. 19,
1974) (on file at American Citizens Concerned for Life Records, Box 4, Gerald Ford
Presidential Library) [hereinafter Horan to NRLC Bd. of Dirs.]; Memorandum from Joseph
P. Witherspoon, Consultant, Pub. Pol’y Comm., NRLC, to Exec. Comm., NRLC 5 (Aug. 14,
1973) (on file at American Citizens Concerned for Life Records, Box 4, Gerald Ford
Presidential Library) [hereinafter Witherspoon to Exec. Comm.].
117 See, e.g., Horan to NRLC Bd. of Dirs., supra note 116, at 1–5.
118 ZIEGLER, supra note 9, at 165 (quoting NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE COMM., RESOLUTION 7
(July 10, 1973) (on file at American Citizens Concerned for Life Records, Box 4, 1973
National Right to Life Committee, Folder 4)).
119 See, e.g., Witherspoon to Exec. Comm., supra note 116, at 5.
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in performing or of parents in seeking abortions.”120 Witherspoon proposed an amend-
ment that would mirror the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of slavery, and he saw
a close parallel between the two issues.121 Except in circumstances in which “reasonable
medical certainty” indicated that a woman’s life would be at risk, Witherspoon’s
amendment provided that “[n]o abortion shall be performed by any person.”122
Witherspoon’s amendment did not spell out whether women could face prosecu-
tion for self-inducing abortion, but his focus on the actions of private citizens, rather
than agents of the state, reflected the movement’s broader purpose.123 Maximizing
protection for the unborn mattered most to Witherspoon, and he did not foreclose
the possibility of prosecuting anyone who performed an abortion, including women
who tried to terminate their own pregnancies.124
Dennis Horan, a leading AUL member and the head of the NRLC Legal Advi-
sory Committee, similarly asked the movement for an amendment that would reach
“the bulk of abortions in America [which] are done by private clinics, not through
public hospitals.”125 Nellie Gray, a prominent movement member and the founder
of March for Life, also favored an amendment that reached state action, further
recommending a registry that would require all women to get a certificate that they
had given birth, miscarried, or had an abortion.126 This requirement would make it
easier to smoke out abortions and, in Gray’s words, ensure that “society would pro-
tect the unborn child just as it is beginning to protect the battered child.”127
By the fall of 1974, leading movement lawyers worked to reach a consensus about
the contours of an ideal amendment.128 The lawyers proposed a constitutional amend-
ment that reached private actors and a model statute making it a crime for a person to
use “any instrument, medicine, or other drug or other substance whatever, with the in-
tent to procure a miscarriage on any woman.”129 The model statute also made it a crime
to perform, aid or abet, or conspire with another to perform an abortion.130
120 Id. (emphasis omitted).
121 See id. (“What is needed is a Human Life Amendment that prohibits abortions by
private persons much as the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery. . . . Indeed, there is a
very close resemblance between killing human beings by abortion and submitting them to
slavery. . . . Slaves were also beaten and killed by their masters.”).
122 Id. at 1.
123 See id. at 6.
124 See id.
125 Memorandum from Dennis J. Horan, Legal Advisory Comm., NRLC, to NRLC Pub.
Pol’y Comm. (Sept. 5, 1973) (on file at American Citizens Concerned for Life Records, Box
4, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michigan) [hereinafter Horan to NRLC Pub.
Pol’y Comm.].
126 Gray to NRLC Bd. of Dirs., supra note 116, at 4.
127 Id.
128 See Horan to NRLC Bd. of Dirs., supra note 116, at 1–3; see also Horan to NRLC Pub.
Pol’y Comm., supra note 125, at 1–2.
129 Horan to NRLC Bd. of Dirs., supra note 116, at 4.
130 See id. at 4–5.
750 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:735
The lawyers did not spell out who would be punished under the statute, but a press
release suggested that NRLC had not eliminated the possibility of penalizing women.131
NRLC suggested that the amendment would ensure that the proposal would “protect
the lives of unborn children not only against action of the state and federal govern-
ments but also against the action of private individuals, such as pregnant women and
physicians.”132
The campaign for a fetal-protective amendment stalled, putting off further
discussion of the desirability of punishing women;133 Congress held several rounds
of hearings, but the full Senate never considered any of them. After the election of
Ronald Reagan, however, movement members had new hope.134 Since 1976, Reagan
had been the pro-life movement’s most visible ally, and a majority in both houses
of Congress seemed open to a far-reaching solution that would undo Roe.135 In 1981,
Congress again considered two proposals that would have overruled Roe.136 One
would simply have undone the Court’s decision and allowed the states and Congress
to criminalize abortion.137 Another, the human life bill, defined an unborn child as
a person from the moment of conception.138
Seeking to stoke opposition to the bill, pro-choice groups seized on the possibil-
ity that women would be punished.139 A reporter asked Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT),
131 See Press Release, NRLC 3–4 (Mar. 14, 1974) (on file at American Citizens Concerned
for Life Records, at Gerald Ford Presidential Library).
132 Id. at 4.
133 See Human Life Amendments, supra note 112, at 1–3; Human Life Amendments High-
lights: United States Congress (1973–2003), HUM. LIFE ACTION, https://www.humanlifeaction
.org/sites/default/files/HLAhghlts.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JWN-ZSP7] (last visited Feb. 21, 2018).
134 On Reagan’s relationship to pro-life movement, see, for example, LEE EPSTEIN &
JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH
PENALTY 231 (1992) (“Pro-life forces took [the 1980 elections, including the election of
Ronald Reagan,] as portents that the political tide had shifted in their direction.”); WILLIAMS,
supra note 7, at 239–42 (detailing the pro-life movement’s support of Reagan); ZIEGLER,
supra note 9, at 83 (“The election of Ronald Reagan . . . united the movement. Indeed, the
1980 election season inspired profound optimism.”).
135 On the movement’s prospects in 1980, see, for example, ZIEGLER, supra note 9, at 83.
136 See, e.g., id. at 84–88 (discussing both the human life bill and the Hatch Amendment);
see also TRIBE, supra note 43, at 161–62.
137 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 43, at 162–63 (explaining that the Hatch Amendment “would
let the states or Congress decide whether or not abortion should be outlawed”); ZIEGLER,
supra note 9, at 86 (stating that the Hatch Amendment “would give Congress and the states
joint jurisdiction over abortion”).
138 See, e.g., ZIEGLER, supra note 9, at 84; Joan Beck, The Pro-Life Groups Turn to Con-
gress on Abortion, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 1981, at B2.
139 See, e.g., As Congressmen Take Up the Abortion Issue, Two Sides Debate: When Does
Life Begin?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1981, at E16 [hereinafter When Does Life Begin]; see also
TRIBE, supra note 43, at 161–65 (acknowledging pro-choice opposition to Senator Jesse
Helms’s proposed human life bill).
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the champion of a states’ rights amendment undoing Roe, whether women would be
prosecuted if they sought out abortion after being raped.140 Hatch responded that this
was the kind of detail that would have to be worked out after the ratification of the
amendment.141 When the reporter pushed Hatch to elaborate, he explained:
I think we would have a much better chance of getting it through
the Congress if those two exceptions were put in. I personally
prefer the constitutional amendment. That makes no exception
except to save the life of the mother. But on the other hand, let’s
face it, the amendment to the Medicaid funding, which was al-
ready on the books, did provide for abortions to save the life of
the mother and for rape or incest. Those of us who believe in the
sanctity of human life were not totally happy with that, but we
thought it was better than leaving it up to bureaucrats which human
life can be taken and using federal dollars to have indiscriminate
abortions all over America. I believe we should do whatever we
can to protect the sanctity of human life. If that’s as far as we can
go, then I’d rather do that than not have any protection.142
Hatch’s comment reflected the ambiguity of pro-lifers’ position on punishing women;
the idea of punishing women did not preoccupy movement members, but Hatch seemed
open to the idea if the unborn child would receive more protection.143Although move-
ment leaders had not shown particular interest in the idea of punishing women, move-
ment members had not ruled out anything that would make abortion harder to access.144
With Ronald Reagan in the White House and an anti-abortion majority in
Congress, pro-lifers had hope that a fetal-protective amendment would pass, but
internal divisions spelled the end of any meaningful progress.145 Movement absolut-
ists, led by Judie Brown of the American Life League (ALL), actively opposed any
amendment that did not ban abortion outright.146 In March 1982, Senator Jesse
Helms (R-NC) proposed a different version of his bill, and the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee approved Hatch’s amendment for consideration by the full Senate.147 Senator
140 See When Does Life Begin, supra note 139.
141 See id.
142 Id.
143 See id. (quoting Senator Hatch as saying, “I believe we should do whatever we can to
protect the sanctity of human life”).
144 See, e.g., id.
145 See, e.g., ALESHA E. DOAN, OPPOSITION & INTIMIDATION: THE ABORTION WARS &
STRATEGIES OF POLITICAL HARASSMENT 82–83 (2007); WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 244–45;
ZIEGLER, supra note 9, at 77–91.
146 See, e.g., ZIEGLER, supra note 9, at 77–80.
147 See, e.g., id. at 84, 88.
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Robert Packwood (R-OR), a stalwart supporter of abortion rights, filibustered the
amendment, and pro-lifers were too divided to overcome it.148 Hatch tried a last
time, working with Senator Thomas Eagleton (D-MO) to propose an amendment
stating simply that the Constitution did not protect an abortion right.149 With pro-
lifers bitterly divided, the Hatch-Eagleton Amendment went down in the Senate by
a vote of 49–50, with one abstaining.150
The demise of the Hatch-Eagleton Amendment began a new chapter in pro-life
discussions of abortion and punishment; in the mid-1980s, movement leaders gave
up on pursuing a constitutional amendment, at least in the near term.151 At the same
time, movement members saw new promise in the courts.152 In City of Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. (Akron I),153 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
dissented, calling into question the workability of Roe’s trimester framework.154
O’Connor’s vote focused movement leaders on statutes that a reconfigured Supreme
Court might uphold.155
While the movement’s strategy had changed, the contradictions in its position
on punishing women only deepened. On the one hand, in an effort to expand pro-
tection for the unborn child and convince the public of the extremism of the Roe
Court, pro-lifers proposed measures that demonized some choices during pregnancy.156
Some within AUL and NRLC worked to ban abortions for particular reasons that the
public would find offensive, such as sex-selection or convenience.157 In support of
these laws, movement members denounced women who terminated their pregnancies
for such frivolous reasons.158 In the same period, anti-abortion activists campaigned
148 See, e.g., id. at 88.
149 See, e.g., id. at 88–89.
150 See, e.g., id. at 89.
151 See, e.g., Reginald Stuart, Abortion Foes End Meeting Optimistic Despite Setbacks,
N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1983, at 16.
152 See ZIEGLER, supra note 9, at 89, 223 (describing how activists began to invest more
in the vetting of judicial nominees); Letter from Americans United for Life to AUL Donor
(May 21, 1984) (on file at Papers of Mildred Jefferson, Schlesinger Library, Harvard Uni-
versity) [hereinafter AUL Fundraising Letter (1984)] (“We may be only one Supreme Court
Justice away from a Court that would reverse the abortion ruling—with five pro-abortion
Justices probably very close to retirement.”).
153 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
154 See id. at 452–59 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The trimester or ‘three-stage’ approach
adopted by the Court in Roe . . . cannot be supported as a legitimate or useful framework for
accommodating the woman’s right and the State’s interests.”).
155 See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, Liberty and the Politics of Balance: The Undue-Burden Test
After Casey/Hellerstedt, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 421, 443–46 (2017); Stuart, supra note 151.
For more on the movement’s response to the O’Connor dissent, see discussion infra Part II.
156 See, e.g., AUL Fundraising Letter (1984), supra note 152, at 2 (stating laws preventing
women from having “sex-selective” abortions must be passed).
157 See id.
158 See, e.g., id. (criticizing abortions done for reasons such as sex-selection).
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to expand laws against homicide or child abuse to fetal life, in the process seeking
to criminalize drug use and other actions taken by women during pregnancy.159
At the same time, pro-lifers began putting much more emphasis on the idea that
women were victims, not perpetrators. In the early 1980s, organizations like Project
Rachel and Women Exploited by Abortion (WEBA) hosted support sessions for
women who felt that they had been traumatized by abortion.160 Groups like NRLC
and AUL had always welcomed the participation of WEBA, but had not initially
stressed the victimization of women; in the mid- to late 1980s, for several reasons,
mainstream organizations stressed these arguments far more often.161 The increasing
importance of crisis pregnancy centers convinced movement members of the im-
portance of persuading individual women not to terminate their pregnancies; new
members, like David Reardon and Wanda Franz, put woman-protective claims in
the spotlight.162 Confronted by new poll data and focus groups studies, the AUL and
NRLC concluded that no one would support abortion if it hurt women.163
II. FETAL-ABUSE LAWS AND WOMAN-PROTECTIVE ARGUMENTS:
THE NEW CONTRADICTION
In the 1980s and early 1990s, debate about whether women would or should ever
be punished for abortion took a much more prominent place in movement discus-
sions.164 At first, after the Supreme Court struck down a promising model ordinance
in Akron I,165 pro-lifers scrambled to see what was still possible.166 Some favored
non-legal solutions, including a larger investment in crisis pregnancy centers.167 Others
preferred to seek out solutions in other legal areas, bolstering fetal protections in
criminal law and eliminating tort actions for wrongful life or birth.168
At a major 1983 strategy conference, movement members developed a long-
term plan of attack that pointed in two directions when it came to punishing
159 Cf. FLORA DAVIS, MOVING THE MOUNTAIN: THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA
SINCE 1960, at 243–44 (1991); ZIEGLER, supra note 9, at 64–68; AUL Fundraising Letter
(1984), supra note 152, at 2; Ziegler, supra note 8.
160 See DIAMOND, supra note 19, at 97 (explaining the founding of WEBA); LEE, supra
note 19, at 22–24 (describing pro-life support groups which viewed abortion as psycho-
logically damaging).
161 See, e.g., LEE, supra note 19, at 22–24.
162 See id. at 23–24.
163 Cf. id. at 22–24. See generally Jensen, supra note 12; Ziegler, supra note 8.
164 See Willke, The Woman Should Not Be Punished, supra note 13, at 3.
165 See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983);
see also ZIEGLER, supra note 9, at 76 (discussing pro-lifers’ use of a model Akron ordinance).
166 See, e.g., Stuart, supra note 151, at 16.
167 See, e.g., id. (highlighting pro-lifers’ pursuance of “alternatives to abortion,” including
“establishing . . . counseling centers and temporary homes for young women who are
pondering abortion”).
168 Cf. DAVIS, supra note 159, at 243–44; STATEHOUSE UPDATE, supra note 20, at 1–2.
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women.169 Pro-lifers saw the government’s interest in protecting women’s health as
a potential opening for attacking Roe.170 If the Court defined some restrictions as bene-
ficial to women, states would have much more latitude, and pro-lifers could under-
mine the political case for abortion rights altogether. Many movement members
sincerely believed that abortion hurt women, and some had themselves experienced
what they viewed as post-abortion trauma.171 At the same time, finding (or creating)
new sources of evidence about the effect of abortion had clear strategic advantages.
At the same time, movement members hoped to stoke resentment of Roe by
convincing the public of the Court’s extremism.172 This led movement members to
spotlight women who supposedly chose abortion for objectionable or offensive
reasons.173 Moreover, the effort to expand fetal rights came into conflict with the
movement’s emphasis on protecting women; as activists set out to apply child abuse,
neglect, and homicide laws to unborn children, they justified penalties based on the
actions of pregnant women.174
A. Post-Akron Strategy Carries Forward a Contradiction
Notwithstanding O’Connor’s dissent, the Akron I decision was devastating for the
pro-life movement; the Court struck down an Akron, Ohio, ordinance that pro-lifers
had used as a blueprint for multi-restriction laws across the country.175 NRLC President
Dr. John Willke denounced the Court’s “extremism,” and a demoralized movement
gathered on several occasions to determine what tactical possibilities remained.176
At a series of meetings in the aftermath of Akron, the movement developed an
approach that sent a contradictory message about the punishment of women; at the
1983 NRLC National Convention, for example, movement lawyers suggested that
the most obvious choice was to create fetal rights in legal areas disconnected from
169 See AUL Fundraising Letter (1984), supra note 152, at 1.
170 See, e.g., Victor G. Rosenblum & Thomas J. Marzen, Strategies for Reversing Roe v.
Wade Through the Courts, in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: REVERSING ROE V. WADE
THROUGH THE COURTS 201 (Dennis J. Horan, Edward R. Grant & Paige C. Cunningham
eds., 1987) (“If pregnancy and childbirth are rendered safer than abortion . . . [t]he claim that
certain abortion practices should not be regulated . . . would no longer be valid.”).
171 See LEE, supra note 19, at 22–24; see also DIAMOND, supra note 19, at 97.
172 See AUL Fundraising Letter (1984), supra note 152, at 2 (noting “just how radical Roe
v. Wade is”).
173 See id. (noting sex-selection as one offensive reason).
174 Compare Willke, The Woman Should Not Be Punished, supra note 13, at 3 (discussing
punishment of women who had abortions), with Ziegler, supra note 8 (stating the anti-abortion
movement backed prosecutions of women for actions like drug use during pregnancy).
175 See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 452
(1983); ZIEGLER, supra note 9, at 76.
176 See NC News Service, Pro-Lifers Seek Congressional Aid, COURIER-J., June 22, 1983,
at 4.
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abortion.177 NRLC attorney James Bopp, Jr., and AUL Attorney Maura K. Quinlan
encouraged sympathetic state legislators to take aim at wrongful birth and wrongful
life suits in tort, establishing the personhood of the unborn child directly.178
Optimists hoped to pass laws restricting the reasons that certain women had
abortions.179 AUL leaders had introduced a law in Illinois that would have outlawed
sex-selection abortions.180 NRLC leaders saw this kind of legislation as the key to
understanding the Akron Court’s extremism.181 “None of the major regulations before
the Court even restricted the reasons for which abortions could be obtained—but the
Court struck them down anyway,” Willke explained in criticizing the decision.182
Chastising women for seeking out abortions for selfish, immoral, or offensive reasons
seemed to many to be one of the cornerstones of a new strategy.183
An AUL conference, “Reversing Roe v. Wade Through the Courts,” set forth a
more ambitious strategic vision, one that sent conflicting messages about punishing
women.184 Energized by Akron I, AUL members hosted a conference “to unite the
entire movement around a relatively non-controversial proposition, that the Court
should reverse itself.”185 AUL organized the conference in response to “Justice
O’Connor’s encouraging dissent plus the fact that most of the Roe majority would
face the question of retirement following the 1984 presidential election.”186
Those assembled saw the most immediate promise in destabilizing the idea of
fetal viability.187 O’Connor’s dissent had flagged the changing science of viability as
one of the weaknesses of Roe’s trimester framework, and those at the AUL confer-
ence hoped to capitalize on it.188 Victor Rosenblum and Thomas Marzen of AUL
177 STATEHOUSE UPDATE, supra note 20, at 1–2.
178 See id.
179 See id. at 3–6 (providing examples of proposed legislation aimed at restricting the
reasons for which women may have abortions).
180 See id. at 4; see also AUL Fundraising Letter (1984), supra note 152, at 2.
181 See NC News Service, supra note 176; STATEHOUSE UPDATE, supra note 20, at 1–2, 4.
182 Press Release, Nat’l Right to Life Comm. 3 (June 15, 1983) (on file at Morton
Blackwell Files, Box 14, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library).
183 See, e.g., AUL Fundraising Letter (1984), supra note 152, at 2 (supporting laws
prohibiting abortion for sex-selection purposes).
184 See, e.g., id. at 1–2; see also Steven Baer, Report of the Education Division, Americans
United for Life Legal Defense Fund (Mar. 30, 1984) (on file at Papers of Mildred Jefferson,
Box 13, Folder 5, Schlesinger Library, Harvard University).
185 Baer, supra note 184, at 1.
186 Id.
187 See Rosenblum & Marzen, supra note 170, at 198–200; see also ZIEGLER, supra note
9, at 89 (explaining how O’Connor’s Akron I dissent energized the pro-life movement and
opened the possibility that the Court would overrule itself).
188 See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 455–58
(1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“As medical science becomes better able to provide for the
separate existence of the fetus, the point of viability is moved further back toward conception.”);
see also Rosenblum & Marzen, supra note 170, at 198–200.
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laid out an alternative strategy closely linked to the undue-burden test that O’Connor
had articulated.189 The movement might have more success promoting laws that
supposedly benefitted women if pro-lifers could gather enough “favorable statistical
data.”190 As the two explained:
“Accepted medical practices” must change before barriers to
reversal can be broken down; whether or not abortion is “accept-
able” is determined by the views and customary practices of the
very people who perform abortions. They are unwilling to in-
crease the state’s authority to regulate abortion. A possible long-
term approach to meeting this dilemma is the development of
new sources for abortion data.191
Attendees also favored tactics intended to expose “just how radical Roe v. Wade is.”192
This strategy had less to do with any immediate gains in the courts than it did with
the political conversation about abortion; by championing “[l]aws against abortion
because the child’s sex is ‘wrong,’ or when the child can feel pain,”193 the movement
could make voters and justices uncomfortable and more willing to accept new abor-
tion restrictions.194
The strategies emerging from the AUL conference would point the movement
in two directions when it came to the issue of women’s culpability. In seeking to
show that abortion hurt women, movement members committed more and more deeply
to a strategy that could never be reconciled with punishing women.195 At the same
time, in persuading the public that Roe was too radical to support, movement members
highlighted the blameworthiness of women who chose abortion for bad reasons.196
Moreover, as the movement tried to establish fetal personhood, the tension in
the movement’s position on women only increased. Believing that the Court would
not redefine fetal viability any time soon, pro-lifers instead tried to establish fetal
rights in other legal arenas, including criminal law.197 As part of this effort, pro-lifers
signed off on the criminal punishment of pregnant drug users and women who had
189 See Rosenblum & Marzen, supra note 170, at 201–03 (stating, in part, that some Jus-
tices would hold a “compelling interest” on the part of the government in maternal health
would be sufficient to warrant restrictions on abortion).
190 See id. at 201.
191 Id.
192 See AUL Fundraising Letter (1984), supra note 152, at 2.
193 Id.
194 See id.
195 See LEE, supra note 19, at 22–24, 31–33 (discussing some anti-abortion activists’ focus
on women who had abortions as victims).
196 See, e.g., AUL Fundraising Letter (1984), supra note 152, at 2 (criticizing abortions
performed for the purpose of sex-selection).
197 See DAVIS, supra note 159, at 243–44; Ziegler, supra note 8.
2018] SOME FORM OF PUNISHMENT 757
illegal abortions—a position hard to square with the movement’s stated view on the
problems with punishing women.198
B. Child-Abuse Laws and the Rise of Woman-Protective Arguments
From the mid- to late 1980s, the pro-life movement became involved in the in-
creasingly visible battle about prenatal treatment; early in the decade, women who
refused caesarean sections found themselves in court.199 These cases partly reflected
improving obstetric care and new technologies that made it much easier to visualize
the fetus as a patient.200 In this climate, physicians were more willing to intervene to
protect fetal life when women refused certain forms of treatment during pregnancy.201
Later in the decade, the issue gained more public attention when crack use by preg-
nant women made headlines.202
Pro-lifers took public interest in pregnant drug users and forced caesareans as
an opportunity to expand fetal rights.203 AUL took the lead in this effort; in 1986,
the organization got involved in the case of Pamela Rae Stewart, a twenty-seven-
year-old woman whose child was born brain dead with amphetamines in his system
and died five weeks later.204 Prosecutors charged Stewart with a misdemeanor linked
to her failure to seek appropriate medical care for her son.205
Pro-lifers, including AUL members, applauded the move; Edward Grant, then the
leader of AUL, stated that “the law should hold the mother-fetal relationship in the
same manner in which parents are held accountable for a child’s welfare.”206 The head
of an NRLC affiliate in San Diego explained that a campaign against fetal abuse would
bolster the movement’s case against legal abortion: “[W]hat about the woman who has
salt solution injected into her womb for the purpose of an abortion?” he asked.207 “It
would be madness to rule that taking cocaine, for example, and then harming the
infant is prosecutable but injecting salt to kill it isn’t.”208
198 See DAVIS, supra note 159, at 243–44; Ziegler, supra note 8.
199 See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 159, at 244; SARA DUBOW, OURSELVES UNBORN: A HISTORY
OF THE FETUS IN MODERN AMERICA 116 (2011); SUSAN MARKENS, SURROGATE MOTHER-
HOOD AND THE POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION 54 (2007).
200 See, e.g., JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRO-
DUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 174 (1994).
201 See, e.g., id.
202 See, e.g., DUBOW, supra note 199, at 137, 140; JEAN REITH SCHROEDEL, IS THE FETUS
A PERSON? A COMPARISON OF POLICIES ACROSS THE FIFTY STATES 101 (2000).
203 See DUBOW, supra note 199, at 112–14; Rich, supra note 20; see also Dennis Georgatos,
Controversy Rises Over Charges of Pre-Natal Fetal Abuse, SUN SENTINEL, Oct. 5, 1986, at
5A; Cynthia Gorney, Whose Body Is It Anyway? The Legal Maelstrom that Rages When the
Rights of Mother and Fetus Collide, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1988, at D1.
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The new legal and political focus on fetal treatment came at a time when pro-
lifers took fresh interest in arguments about protecting women. Post-abortion support
groups had already operated for some time; in 1982, Nancy Jo Mann, a devoutly
religious woman, founded WEBA as a support group for women who regretted their
abortions.209 Formed in 1984 by Victoria Thorn in Milwaukee with the help of the
local archdiocese, Project Rachel offered counseling and support to women who felt
traumatized or guilty about abortion.210 As early as 1983, NRLC argued that Roe
“defended the interests not of women but of the assembly line abortion industry,”211
and AUL members called for new sources of data that would prove abortion hurt
women.212 While movement leaders always welcomed the presence of WEBA and
Project Rachel, activists did not initially invest many strategic resources in the organi-
zations or adopt a focus on women.213
By the mid-1980s, movement leaders had several reasons to put more emphasis
on woman-protective arguments. In the early part of the decade, Planned Parenthood,
a group that had always fought for abortion rights, became more directly involved,
and pro-life groups responded by campaigning to cut off the organization’s Title X
family planning funding.214 In the period, movement members tried to make Planned
Parenthood a symbol of what pro-lifers described as a deeply flawed abortion
industry.215 Movement members soon realized that Planned Parenthood would be a
formidable—and popular—enemy; a 1985 poll conducted by the Lewis Harris
Foundation found overwhelming majorities in favor of Planned Parenthood’s family
planning work.216 When pro-lifers put out a film, The Silent Scream,217 that narrated
an abortion in real time, Planned Parenthood responded by emphasizing the rights
209 On the founding and early years of WEBA, see, for example, DIAMOND, supra note
19, at 97; DUBOW, supra note 199, at 161.
210 On the founding and early years of Project Rachel, see, for example, CYNTHIA
BURACK, TOUGH LOVE: SEXUALITY, COMPASSION, AND THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT 76 (2014);
LEE, supra note 19, at 24.
211 Linda Greenhouse, Court Reaffirms Right to Abortion and Bars Variety of Local
Curbs: Strict Akron Ordinance Is Held Unconstitutional—Women’s Choice Advocates See
Big Victory, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1983, at A1.
212 See, e.g., Rosenblum & Marzen, supra note 170, at 201.
213 See, e.g., PAUL SAURETTE & KELLY GORDON, THE CHANGING VOICE OF THE ANTI-
ABORTION MOVEMENT: THE RISE OF “PRO-WOMAN” RHETORIC IN CANADA AND THE UNITED
STATES 198–206 (2015).
214 On the campaign to cut off Title X funding for Planned Parenthood, see SUZANNE
STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT: ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVISM IN THE ABOR-
TION CONFLICT 134 (1991); RAYMOND TATALOVICH, THE POLITICS OF ABORTION IN THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 179 (1997).
215 See, e.g., STAGGENBORG, supra note 214, at 134; TATALOVICH, supra note 214, at 179.
216 See Janice Mall, Public Favors Birth Control Messages, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1985,
at H3.
217 See Dena Kleiman, Debate on Abortion Focuses on Graphic Film, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 1985, at B8.
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and needs of women.218 Countering this tactic required pro-lifers to demonstrate
more effectively that they cared about women.
In the same period, pro-lifers believed that the spread of crisis pregnancy centers
bolstered the movement’s claims to have women’s best interests at heart.219 By 1985,
Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority had founded the Save-A-Baby program, maternity
and adoption centers intended to create alternatives to abortion.220 Over 250 centers
affiliated with Save-A-Baby were in operation by the mid-1980s.221 Anti-abortion
counseling centers also spread after 1984 when Robert Pearson put out a handbook
on how to run a crisis pregnancy center.222 By the end of 1986, the number of centers
had grown from a handful to over 3,000.223 With so many centers in place, pro-lifers
could more credibly claim to focus on women.
Finally, David Reardon, an activist who had worked closely with WEBA, began
publishing his own research on the after-effects of abortion.224 Reardon took WEBA
members as his subjects and used their experiences to show that post-abortion harms
were demonstrable.225 Reardon spotlighted those he believed to be at particular risk
for post-abortion trauma, but he suggested that many women suffered after having
abortions.226
Later in the 1980s, as woman-protective arguments took on more importance,
movement members took more interest in punishing women for behavior during
pregnancy.227 Between 1988 and 1989, mainstream anti abortion groups, such as AUL,
remained involved in fetal-abuse cases in Illinois, including drug abuse and forced-
caesarean cases.228 Clarke Forsythe, a leading attorney in AUL, told the Chicago
218 See, e.g., Elizabeth Mehren, A Family’s Pain Echoes in ‘Choices,’ L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15,
1986, at SDC1; see also Elizabeth Mehren, Medical Group Cites Flaws in ‘Silent Scream,’
Response, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 3, 1985), http://articles.latimes.com/1985-12-03/news/vw-12959
_1_silent-scream [https://perma.cc/2M7Y-HZHA].
219 See Bill Lohmann, New-Style Maternity Homes Offer Religion with Prenatal Care,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1987, at AO10; see also DIAMOND, supra note 19, at 97; LEE, supra
note 19, at 22–24.
220 See, e.g., Sarah Oates, Maternity Homes Try to Abort Abortion, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22,
1985, at B5; see also Lohmann, supra note 219.
221 See Oates, supra note 220.
222 See Nancy Blodgett, Abortion Clinics That Aren’t, 72 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1, 1986, at 21;
Anti-Abortion Clinics Focus of Hearing in House Today, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1986, at B12
[hereinafter Anti-Abortion Clinics].
223 See Anti-Abortion Clinics, supra note 222.
224 On Reardon’s claims and influence, see BURACK, supra note 210, at 62–64, 66, 75;
DUBOW, supra note 199, at 161; JOHANNA SCHOEN, ABORTION AFTER ROE 238–39 (2015).
225 See, e.g., BURACK, supra note 210, at 63, 206; DUBOW, supra note 199, at 161; SCHOEN,
supra note 224, at 146, 238–39.
226 For a sample of Reardon’s writing on the effects of abortion on women, see DAVID C.
REARDON, ABORTED WOMEN: SILENT NO MORE (1987); DAVID C. REARDON, MAKING ABOR-
TION RARE: A HEALING STRATEGY FOR A DIVIDED NATION (1996).
227 See Rich, supra note 20; see also Georgatos, supra note 203.
228 See Rich, supra note 20.
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Tribune about the organization’s position on the issue, insisting that “[p]unishing
women is not the answer.”229 Nevertheless, Forsythe signed off on the punishment of
some actions taken by pregnant women, so long as penalties were reasonable.230 “A
clear, high standard should be placed on the prosecutor to determine willful, malicious
child abuse before any woman is charged,” he explained, “[t]hat would exclude mis-
conduct like smoking and nutrition, which is not willful and malicious misconduct.”231
Forsythe carved out a strategy that would have some staying power; AUL claimed
not to punish women and opposed the practice.232 Nevertheless, Forsythe recognized
a category of women deserving punishment—those who willfully or intentionally
harmed their children.233 This category encompassed women willing to break existing
criminal laws.234 It seemed clear that women breaking some abortion laws could fall
in the same category as women abusing illegal drugs.235
Through the end of 1988, AUL continued emphasizing this approach, working
alongside hospitals compelling caesarean sections and calling for the prosecution of
women who used drugs during pregnancy.236 As the organization explained in its
newsletter, members viewed this work as an important step in the attack on legal
abortion.237 Such cases, as AUL explained, offered “yet another opportunity for AUL
to defend the state’s compelling interest to protect viable fetal life, a critical element
in the strategy to reverse Roe.”238
However, by the summer of 1989, it had become far more important for the move-
ment to denounce punishing women. First, during an election-season debate, George
H.W. Bush had mishandled a question on abortion, suggesting that he favored punish-
ing and perhaps even jailing women who had abortions.239 The statement prompted
a public backlash, a retraction from Bush, and a renewed effort by pro-lifers to re-







235 Cf. id.; Ziegler, supra note 8 (stating that the mainstream anti-abortion movement
supported criminal prosecution of women for acts such as drug abuse).
236 See Gorney, supra note 203; ACLU Contests C-Section Delivery of Viable Fetus, LIFE
DOCKET (Ams. United for Life, Chi., Ill.), Aug. 1988, at 2 (on file at Southern Baptist His-
torical Library and Archives) [hereinafter ACLU Contests C-Section]; Ziegler, supra note 8.
237 See ACLU Contests C-Section, supra note 236, at 2.
238 Id.
239 On Bush’s comments, see E. J. DIONNE, JR., WHY AMERICANS HATE POLITICS 316
(1991); WILLIAM SALETAN, BEARING RIGHT: HOW CONSERVATIVES WON THE ABORTION
WAR 60 (2003).
240 On pro-lifers’ reaction to Bush’s comments, see Gerald M. Boyd, Bush Camp Offers
a Clarified Stand About Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1988, at A1; Willke, Never The
Mother, supra note 13.
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The following summer, the Supreme Court convinced many pro-lifers that it
would be possible in the near term for states to ban abortion again.241 Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services242 involved a multi-restriction Missouri law.243 The
Court’s plurality decision not only upheld a public-funding ban and a statutory def-
inition of viability but also suggested that Roe’s trimester framework was deeply
flawed.244 “The key elements of the Roe framework—trimesters and viability—are not
found in the text of the Constitution or in any place else one would expect to find
a constitutional principle,” the Court explained.245
While the Webster Court did not overrule Roe, the 1989 decision convinced
many that the end for the decision would come soon.246 To raise fears about the con-
sequences of reversal, pro-choice activists began searching for cases in which women
had been punished for having abortions.247 John Willke of the NRLC assured the media
that pro-lifers would never want to see women penalized for having an abortion.248
Willke took the same position internally. “With rare exceptions, [the woman] is the
second victim,” he wrote in the National Right to Life News.249 “She needs help,
counseling, education, [and] love . . . . She does not need aid in killing her own baby
nor should she be given criminal punishment.”250
Between 1989 and 1993, pro-lifers invested much more in the woman-protective
arguments than had circulated since the 1980s.251 In this period, with a pro-choice
president in office for the first time in decades and anti-abortion violence in the
news, pro-lifers desperately wanted to convince ambivalent Americans that abortion,
not abortion opponents, hurt women.252 For this reason, movement leaders played
down any effort to criminalize women’s conduct during pregnancy, instead spot-
lighting the harms produced by abortion itself.253
After 1992, when the Supreme Court decided Planned Parenthood of Southeast-
ern Pennsylvania v. Casey,254 pro-lifers channeled resources into laws, like targeted
regulations of abortion providers (TRAP) statutes and informed-consent measures,
241 See The Pro-Life Movement One Year Later: In the Wake of Webster, AUL F. (Ams.
United for Life, Chi., Ill.), Fall 1990, at 7 [hereinafter Wake of Webster].
242 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
243 See id. at 499.
244 See id. at 510–11, 518.
245 Id. at 518.
246 See Wake of Webster, supra note 241, at 7.
247 For an example of this strategy, see Walter Dellinger, The Abortion Decision: Monu-
ment to Confusion, WASH. POST, July 9, 1989, at B1.




252 See id.; see also Minutes of Board Meeting (Apr. 24, 1993), supra note 21, at 3.
253 See Willke, The Woman Should Not Be Punished, supra note 13.
254 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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that fit easily within a woman-protective agenda.255 When the Court upheld the Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act in Gonzales v. Carhart256 in 2007, pro-lifers pursued a more
aggressive agenda, one anchored to woman-protective claims.257 As state legislators
and prosecutors believed that they had more room to work, they also passed laws
authorizing the punishment of women who terminated their own pregnancies.258
Without foregrounding these laws, pro-lifers did nothing to oppose these prosecu-
tions.259 While committing fully to a woman-protective agenda, pro-lifers left open
important questions about what it meant to protect women in the first place.260
III. PROVING ABORTION-RELATED HARMS AND THE PROSECUTION OF WOMEN
From 1988 to the present, pro-lifers have developed a potent woman-protective
rhetorical strategy that shapes everything from the movement’s message to its legis-
lative strategy.261 This Part traces how this tactic took on so much importance at a time
when prosecutors began bringing charges against certain women for having abortions.
First, this Part explores the attempt to collect evidence about the effects of abortion
on women. When Surgeon General C. Everett Koop concluded that there was not
enough evidence to establish any post-abortion syndrome, pro-lifers did not lose
interest in woman-protective arguments.262 Next, this Part explores the emphasis
pro-lifers put on woman-protective strategies after Casey. After 2003, as this Part
shows, pro-life lawmakers believed that the Court would uphold a much wider range
of abortion restrictions, including those that came much closer to punishing women
for having an abortion.263
255 See Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much) Settled the Abortion
Wars, 118 Yale L.J. 1318, 1329 (2009); see also Ziegler, supra note 155, at 440–51.
256 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
257 See Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-
Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U ILL. L. REV. 991 [hereinafter Siegel, The New
Politics]; Mary Ziegler, Substantial Uncertainty: Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt and
the Future of Abortion Law, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 78–79, 98–99, 114–15.
258 See Michelle Goldberg, Abortions Return to Back Alleys Amid Restrictive New State
Laws, DAILY BEAST (June 3, 2011, 5:44 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/abortions-re
turn-to-back-alleys-amid-restrictive-new-state-laws [https://perma.cc/Z3X5-SZC9]; Rowan,
supra note 4.
259 See Goldberg, supra note 258; Rowan, supra note 4.
260 See Goldberg, supra note 258; Rowan, supra note 4; Siegel, The New Politics, supra
note 257.
261 See supra Section II.B; see also Ziegler, supra note 155, at 450–51. See generally
Mary Ziegler, Women’s Rights on the Right: The History and Stakes of Modern Pro-Life
Feminism, 28 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 232 (2013) (discussing, in part, pro-life woman-
protective arguments and strategy).
262 See Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of
Woman-Protective Antiabortion Arguments, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1663–68 (2008) [hereinafter
Siegel, The Right’s Reasons]; Letter from David C. Reardon to C. Everett Koop, U.S. Surgeon
Gen. (July 1, 1988) (on file with author).
263 See discussion infra Section III.B.
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A. Pro-Lifers Try to Prove that Abortion Hurts Women
In 1988–1989, pro-lifers eagerly awaited the findings of Surgeon General C.
Everett Koop about the effects of abortion on women.264 Koop had openly aligned
himself with the pro-life movement in the early 1980s, and his involvement inspired
optimism among pro-lifers.265
David Reardon, the author of several books on the subject, wrote Koop in 1987
about the strategic importance of the issue: “It is my belief that abortion should no
longer be presented as a moral issue to which people will close their minds, but rather
as a public health issue.”266 In July 1988, Reardon wrote again, highlighting research
that he claimed would identify the women most at risk of psychological damage after
abortion.267 Reardon stated that a majority of aborting women face “a great deal of
pressure from their circumstances, their society, and from their family and friends, to
submit to the ‘commonsense’ of abortion as a solution to their problems.”268 Reardon
insisted that there was certainly enough proof to justify further studies about the
effects of abortion on women.269
Ultimately, Koop met with twenty-seven groups, including leading pro-life and
abortion-rights organizations with their own views about the effects of abortion on
women.270 In January 1989, Koop wrote the President that the existing evidence did
not support any conclusion whatsoever.271 He cited methodological problems with
published studies and obstacles to accumulating better evidence: women did not
often report abortions, clinics did not keep records, and causation was hard to
prove.272 Meaningful results, Koop wrote, would take years and hundreds of millions
of dollars.273 “[T]he available scientific evidence about the psychological sequelae
of abortion simply cannot support either the preconceived beliefs of those of the pro-
life or of those pro-choice” movements, Koop wrote.274
264 See Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, supra note 262, at 1662–64; D. MICHAEL LINDSAY,
FAITH IN THE HALLS OF POWER: HOW EVANGELICALS JOINED THE AMERICAN ELITE 39–40
(2007).
265 On Koop’s ties to the pro-life movement, see LINDSAY, supra note 264, at 39–40; NEIL
J. YOUNG, WE GATHER TOGETHER: THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT AND THE PROBLEM OF INTERFAITH
POLITICS 161 (2016).
266 Letter from David C. Reardon to C. Everett Koop, U.S. Surgeon Gen. (Sept. 14, 1987)
(on file with the author).
267 See Letter from David C. Reardon to C. Everett Koop, U.S. Surgeon Gen. (July 1,
1988) (on file with the author).
268 Id.
269 See id.
270 See Letter from C. Everett Koop, U.S. Surgeon Gen., to Ronald Reagan, U.S. President
(Jan. 9, 1989) (on file with author).
271 See id. at 2.
272 See id. at 3.
273 See id.
274 Id. at 2.
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When the letter leaked, Koop refrained from commenting, but the outcome was
clear.275 Reardon hoped that the White House would push for further studies about
the effects of abortion, but the movement had clearly suffered a setback.276 Some
thought that it might no longer make sense to stress woman-protective arguments
that even a sympathetic surgeon general refused to embrace.277
After Webster, pro-lifers rebounded, strategizing about how best to exploit the
best news the movement had received from the Court since 1973.278 To be sure,
Webster energized the movement; for example, the AUL’s donations topped $1 million
for the first time.279 NRLC plotted legislation in states willing to criminalize abortion
after Roe.280 However, Webster also exposed strategic differences between the move-
ment’s leading organizations.281 AUL leaders saw Webster as an important step but
believed that the movement could make headway only if members could bring a
perfect test case.282 While Jim Bopp of the NRLC boasted about what he called “the
‘de facto over-ruling’ of Roe v. Wade by [Webster],”283 AUL described Webster as
“an invitation to pursue [an] incremental strategy.”284
These different ideas about Webster informed the organization’s contrasting
strategies; AUL suggested that legislators focus on the circumstances in each in-
dividual state, pursuing realistic statutes and avoiding any sign of weakness.285 By
contrast, NRLC was less cautious about measures that alienated or demonized
women.286 If abortion could be banned again, NRLC lawyers planned to lay traps for
providers that would trigger far-reaching injunctions and severe penalties.287 The
organization reconfirmed that women should not face punishment and introduced
275 See LINDSAY, supra note 264, at 41.
276 On Reardon and other pro-lifers’ efforts to keep the issue alive, see Warren E. Leary,
Koop Challenged on Abortion Data: Doctors Say They Can Show Long-Term Effect Is Slight,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1989, at 1; Letter from David C. Reardon to C. Everett Koop, U.S.
Surgeon Gen. (Apr. 10, 1989) (on file with author).
277 See Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, supra note 262, at 1664–68; Ziegler, supra note 261,
at 94–96.
278 See Legislating to Restore the Sanctity of Human Life After Webster: A Statement of
Principle, Policy, and Strategy, AUL BRIEFING MEMO (Ams. United for Life, Chi., Ill.), Dec.
1990; Wake of Webster, supra note 241.
279 See Minutes of Board Meeting: October 28, 1989, Ams. United for Life (on file at
Papers of Mildred Jefferson, Box 13, Folder 8, Schlesinger Library, Harvard University).
280 See, e.g., id. at 3.
281 See id. at 2–3.
282 See id.
283 Id. at 3.
284 Wake of Webster, supra note 241, at 1.
285 See, e.g., id. at 1–2.
286 See, e.g., Balch, supra note 9.
287 See J.C. Willke, Our Primary Goal—To Stop the Killing, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS,
June 22, 1989, at 3 (stating that NRLC supported punishments of abortion providers).
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a legislative agenda that included woman-protective informed-consent laws.288
“Women facing the possibility of abortion should have the right to hear the facts and
arguments from both sides, not just the abortionists,” the National Right to Life
News confirmed.289
At the same time, NRLC pushed aggressive laws that portrayed women as shallow
and selfish.290 The organization sponsored laws banning abortion as a method of
birth control or outlawing the procedure for reasons of sex-selection.291 NRLC lawyers
also reinvigorated the campaign for spousal-notification laws, representing men that at-
torneys claimed were victimized by women who chose abortion without consulting
their partners.292 In 1988, Bopp developed and circulated a handbook for attorneys who
wanted to bring fathers-rights cases.293 The organization’s agenda centered on what
pro-lifers believed were unpopular reasons for choosing abortion.294 That these laws
sent conflicting messages about the blameworthiness of women’s decisions was a
secondary consideration.295
In the meantime, AUL leaders concluded that pro-lifers could never pass the
kinds of laws championed by NRLC unless the movement distanced itself from the
idea of punishing women.296 This move seemed particularly important at a time
when a new clinic-blockade movement, led by Randall Terry’s Operation Rescue,
had grabbed much of the media attention for itself.297 While pro-lifers had always
picketed outside of clinics, the scale and aggressiveness of Operation Rescue’s
campaign in the late 1980s and early 1990s was unprecedented.298 Some associated
with the clinic blockade movement formally endorsed violence, while many others
288 See Balch, supra note 9; Willke, The Woman Should Not Be Punished, supra note 13.
289 Balch, supra note 9 (emphasis removed).
290 Cf. id. (criticizing abortions for sex-selection and birth control).
291 See id.
292 See Martha Brannigan, Suits Argue Fathers’ Rights in Abortion, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23,
1988, at 29; David G. Savage, Fathers’ Appeals to Justices Ask Equal Rights to Children, Even
Unborn, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 25, 1988), http://articles.latimes.com/1988-09-25/news/mn-3861
_1_equal-rights [https://perma.cc/SV6K-9E56]; see also Balch, supra note 9.
293 See Brannigan, supra note 292.
294 See Balch, supra note 9.
295 See, e.g., id.
296 See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 12, at 1, 4–7; Ramsey, supra note 12, at 4 (discussing the
need for the pro-life movement to take a more moderate approach to win support).
297 See, e.g., DOAN, supra note 145, at 86; MARKENS, supra note 199, at 53; Susan Faludi,
Where Did Randy Go Wrong?, MOTHER JONES, Nov. 1989, at 22, 24–25.
298 On the clinic blockade movement, see MICHAEL STEWART FOLEY, FRONT PORCH POL-
ITICS: THE FORGOTTEN HEYDAY OF AMERICAN ACTIVISM IN THE 1970S AND 1980S, at 318
(2013); CAROL MASON, KILLING FOR LIFE: THE APOCALYPTIC NARRATIVE OF PRO-LIFE POLI-
TICS 102 (2002); JENNIFER NELSON, MORE THAN MEDICINE: A HISTORY OF THE FEMINIST
WOMEN’S HEALTH MOVEMENT 147 (2015).
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worked to shut clinics down for as long as possible.299 For groups like AUL, Operation
Rescue sent the wrong message about the movement’s identity; rather than making
a home for respectable, reasonable advocates working through the law, the pro-life
movement described in the media seemed to shelter anti-woman extremists.300
To present a different image to the public, AUL leaders argued that pro-lifers
needed to try twice as hard to appear pro-woman.301 At a conference hosted for state
legislators, AUL leaders drove home the importance of appealing to women.302 “[W]e
are also viewed as extremists, . . . violent, intolerant and unconcerned about women,
poverty and homelessness,” explained Laurie Ann Ramsey, the organization’s public
relations strategist.303 Mary Ellen Jensen urged pro-lifers to follow a strategy shaped
by public opinion polls—one that ruled out any punishment for women.304 “The na-
turally strong focus on concern for the unborn child neglects mention of the mother
of that [unborn] child,” Jensen stated.305 “Communicating greater concern for the
women who face the challenge of an unplanned pregnancy must be a key objective
of any pro-life communications strategy.”306
In 1992, Casey intensified pro-life interest in woman-protective arguments, in-
cluding those denouncing the punishment of women.307 The Court’s opinion focused
on women, entertaining arguments that the procedure was both potentially harmful
to women and a necessary option on which generations of women had relied.308 That
case involved a Pennsylvania statute requiring, among other things, parental notifi-
cation, spousal notification, informed consent, and a waiting period.309 In the lead-up
to the case, movement members asked the Court to overrule Roe.310 The justices
declined the invitation, preserving what the plurality called the “essential holding”
of Roe.311 Nevertheless, the Court reworked its understanding of the abortion right,
describing abortion as a matter of equal treatment for women as well as autonomy.312
A woman’s “suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without
more, upon its own vision of the woman’s role,” the plurality explained.313 “The
299 See, e.g., DOAN, supra note 145, at 85; NELSON, supra note 298, at 147.
300 Compare DOAN, supra note 145, at 85, and NELSON, supra note 298, at 147, with
Jensen, supra note 12, at 4–7.
301 See Jensen, supra note 12, at 1, 4–7.
302 See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 12, at 1, 4–7; Ramsey, supra note 12, at 5.
303 Ramsey, supra note 12, at 4.
304 See Jensen, supra note 12, at 4–7.
305 Id. at 5.
306 Id.
307 See, e.g., Minutes of Board Meeting (Apr. 24, 1993), supra note 21, at 3.
308 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844, 846, 860–61, 875–78
(1992).
309 See id. at 844.
310 See id.
311 Id. at 870–71.
312 See id. at 852–57.
313 Id. at 852.
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destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her
spiritual imperatives and her place in society.”314
The Court’s spotlight on women ran through the remainder of the opinion.315
While refusing to overrule Roe, the Court also undid Roe’s trimester framework,
putting in its place the undue-burden standard.316 Under that standard, a law would
be unconstitutional if it “has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”317
Whether abortion hurt or helped women was central to much of the Court’s
analysis of the undue-burden standard.318 In upholding the Pennsylvania informed-
consent law, the Court reasoned: “In attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend
the full consequences of her decision, the State furthers the legitimate purpose of
reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with
devastating psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully informed.”319
Informed-consent laws, as Casey framed them, benefitted women rather than creating
an impermissible burden.320
By contrast, in striking down the spousal-notification law, the Court emphasized
the damaging sex stereotypes written into the Pennsylvania provision.321 The plurality
denounced the idea of subservient women implied in the law “repugnant to [this
Court’s] present understanding of marriage and of the nature of the rights secured
by the Constitution.”322 The Casey Court concluded that “[a] State may not give to a
man the kind of dominion over his wife that parents exercise over their children.”323
Because of Casey’s focus on women, pro-lifers insisted more often than ever
that their movement protected women rather than demanding their punishment.324
To solidify this argument, pro-lifers had elevated women to positions of power in
both AUL and NRLC.325 In 1993, Paige Comstock Cunningham, an activist interested
in woman-protective arguments, became the head of AUL.326 Wanda Franz, a de-
velopmental psychologist, had taken over the leadership of NRLC the year before
Casey.327 Franz had long challenged the conclusions of the American Psychological
314 Id.
315 See, e.g., id. at 852–53, 856, 858–61.
316 See id. at 876–77.
317 Id. at 877.
318 See id. at 882–83.
319 Id.
320 See id.
321 See id. at 887–99.
322 Id. at 898.
323 Id.
324 See Minutes of Board Meeting (Apr. 24, 1993), supra note 21, at 3.
325 See Marlene Cimons, Koop Backed in Call for Research on Abortion Effects, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 1989, at 21.
326 See Minutes of Board Meeting (Apr. 24, 1993), supra note 21, at 1; Cimons, supra
note 325.
327 See Cimons, supra note 325; Linda Feldmann, Two Voices on Abortion, CHRISTIAN
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Association regarding post-abortion syndrome, arguing that professional organiza-
tions unfairly dismissed the idea out of hand.328 Cunningham saw woman-protective
strategies as central to the movement’s success.329 “We must help people to under-
stand that abortion hurts the woman too,” she told her colleagues in April 1993.330
Casey helped movement members achieve this goal by enabling them to start “pass-
ing and enforcing laws relating to the woman, and that such laws will also save
some children.”331
In October 1993, to put these arguments before the public, AUL developed a
fifteen-year plan.332 The first step involved legislation and arguments that would
“shatter the myth that abortion helps women.”333 To accomplish this goal, AUL and
NRLC prioritized “right to know” laws that would require women to listen to a
script about abortion.334
Movement leaders also saw potential in TRAP regulations; AUL had first em-
phasized this tactic in 1989 in defending an Illinois law with an unusual history.335
This kind of law had first gained support in the state after a 1978 exposé by the
Chicago Sun-Times on the state’s abortion industry.336 Working undercover, report-
ers revealed unsterile, dangerous, dishonest, and unprincipled practices at four
Chicagoland clinics.337 The forty stories published by the Sun-Times sparked new
targeted clinic regulations, and in 1982, at the urging of the pro-life movement, the
state introduced more detailed and onerous regulations.338 In the decades to come,
pro-lifers would renew the push for similar regulations when clinic scandals emerged
in other states and cities.339
When providers challenged those regulations in 1989, pro-life incrementalists
celebrated; the leader of the Illinois Right to Life Committee, a NRLC state affiliate,
SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 25, 1991), https://www.csmonitor.com/1991/1125/25121 .html [https://
perma.cc/QB5Q-6FTZ].
328 See Cimons, supra note 325; Feldmann, supra note 327.
329 See Minutes of Board Meeting (Apr. 24, 1993), supra note 21, at 3.
330 Id.
331 Id.
332 Minutes of Board Meeting: October, 22, 1993, Ams. United for Life (on file at Papers
of Mildred Jefferson, Box 13, Folder 8, Schlesinger Library, Harvard University).
333 Id. at 3.
334 See, e.g., id.; cf. Ziegler, supra note 155, at 451–52.
335 See Kathleen Best, Coalition Gave Life to Illinois Abortion Law, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, July 30, 1989, at 1A.
336 On the Chicago Sun-Times series, see BROOKE KROEGER, UNDERCOVER REPORTING:
THE TRUTH ABOUT DECEPTION 248 (2012); SCHOEN, supra note 224, at 96.
337 See KROEGER, supra note 336, at 248–49.
338 See, e.g., Best, supra note 335.
339 For examples of this strategy, see Ed Anderson, Bill Would Regulate Abortion Clinics
in La. Is Filed, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 18, 1991, at B4; Donna O’Neal, Martinez to HRS: Shut
Clinic—Governor Calls for New Abortion Rules, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 23, 1989, at D1.
Cf. Devins, supra note 255, at 1339–44 (describing, in part, TRAP laws arising after Casey).
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told reporters that his colleagues hoped that the Court would agree to hear the case
Ragsdale v. Turnock.340 “We want [the Court] to have as many opportunities as possible
to look at [Roe v. Wade] to overturn it or chip away at it some more,” he explained.341
Paige Cunningham, a leader of AUL, presented the state’s targeted regulations as
a necessary means of protecting women from abortion.342 Not only did the law not
create an undue burden, the Illinois measure was needed to keep women safe from
“unqualified physicians, unsanitary conditions or debilitating injury.”343
The Court never heard Ragsdale because Illinois settled the suit,344 but pro-lifers
continued using TRAP laws to demonstrate that pro-lifers would never punish
women.345 In 1999, for example, South Carolina used this strategy in defending its
targeted clinic regulations before the Fourth Circuit and in Supreme Court filings.346
The State had introduced a law requiring the licensure of clinics that performed more
than a threshold number of abortions and mandated that the state health department
promulgate regulations to govern all abortion clinics.347 Regulators responded by
issuing a complex set of rules, requiring among other things that all clinics (and no
other freestanding medical facility) undertake extensive physical plant changes, test
all patients for both pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases, and ensure that
only a registered nurse, rather than a physician, supervise nursing staff.348 Citing the
importance of defending the regulations, Clarke Forsythe told other AUL members:
“In most states, veterinary clinics face more regulations than abortion clinics, which
has resulted in numerous deaths of women (the second victims of abortion).”349
Pro-lifers’ deep belief in the harm done to women by abortion always seemed
hard to reconcile with statements suggesting that abortion was murder. After 2009,
however, when states began more often prosecuting women for self-inducing abortion
340 841 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1988), postponing juris., 492 U.S. 916 (1989) (mem.) and
dismissing appeal, 503 U.S. 916 (1992) (mem.); Lynn Sweet, Abortion Foes Fight Deal on
Key Case, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 31, 1989, at 14.
341 Sweet, supra note 340.
342 See, e.g., Jim Merriner, Another Group Opposes Settling of Abortion Case, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Sept. 1, 1989, at 8.
343 Id. (quoting AUL attorney Paige Cunningham).
344 Turnock v. Ragsdale, 503 U.S. 916 (1992) (mem.); see Justices Let Stand Agreement
to Ease Abortion Regulations, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 3, 1990, at A4; see also Greenville
Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1191
(2001).
345 See, e.g., Bryant, 222 F. 3d at 159.
346 See Brief of Appellants at 57–58, Bryant, 222 F.3d 157 (Nos. 99-1319, 99-1710, & 99-
1725).
347 See Bryant, 222 F.3d at 159–62.
348 See id.
349 Letter from Clarke D. Forsythe, President, Ams. United for Life, to Mildred F. Jefferson
1 (Oct. 13, 2000) (on file at Papers of Mildred Jefferson, Box 13, Folder 6, Schlesinger Library,
Harvard University).
770 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:735
or attempting to do so,350 pro-lifers continued emphasizing woman-protective ar-
guments.351 Recent prosecutions exposed a longstanding fault line in the pro-life
position; while many movement members believed that abortion hurt women and
saw the strategic benefits of saying so, pro-lifers did not oppose efforts to punish
women.352 The movement’s goals—maximizing protection for fetal life and protect-
ing women—could easily come into conflict with one another when women them-
selves went to prison.
B. Gonzales, Whole Woman’s Health, and the New Jurisprudence of Punishment
The Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Gonzales v. Carhart emboldened pro-life
lawmakers to push the boundaries of what the Court would tolerate. Gonzales
addressed the constitutionality of the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of
2003, a law outlawing dilation-and-evacuation abortion, a procedure by which a
fetus was removed in one piece.353 The Court not only upheld the law but also cited
woman-protective arguments with approval.354 Gonzales also offered lawmakers more
latitude to restrict abortion, even when doubt remained that a law would negatively
impact women’s health.355 After Gonzales, pro-lifers had new interest in woman-
protective arguments.356 At the same time, the decision inspired much further-
reaching restrictions.357 Movement leaders began to believe it was possible to overrule
Roe, in practice if not in theory.358
The statute and the litigation defending it showed how well the movement could
weave fetal-protective arguments into a campaign nominally centered on women.
When hearing testimony on the statute, Congress considered evidence on the physical
risks of late-term abortions.359 The litigation of Gonzales put arguments about post-
abortion syndrome at the top of the agenda.360 These arguments figured centrally in
350 See Clarke D. Forsythe, The Road Map to Overturning Roe v. Wade: What Can the
States Do Now?, AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE (2012), http://www.aul.org/wp-content/uploads
/2012/04/road-map-overturning-roe.pdf [https://perma.cc/TC5Y-72MP] (discussing, in part,
state laws meant to curb abortion); Rowan, supra note 4.
351 See Forsythe, supra note 350.
352 See id. Cf. generally Rowan, supra note 4.
353 See 550 U.S. 124, 132, 135–38 (2007).
354 See, e.g., id. at 156–64.
355 See id. at 141–43, 162–63.
356 See generally Clarke D. Forsythe & Bradley N. Kehr, A Road Map Through the
Supreme Court’s Back Alley, 57 VILL. L. REV. 45 (2012).
357 See generally Forsythe, supra note 350; Goldberg, supra note 258.
358 Forsythe, supra note 350; Forsythe & Kehr, supra note 356.
359 See H.R. REP. NO. 108-58, at 5, 14–18 (2003) (discussing, in part, risks associated with
late-term, partial-birth abortion) [hereinafter Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act].
360 Brief of Sandra Cano, the Former “Mary Doe” of Doe v. Bolton, and 180 Women
Injured by Abortion as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 22–24, Gonzales, 550 U.S.
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an amicus curiae brief by the conservative Justice Foundation, which in turn drew
on affidavits from Operation Outcry, a group of women who claimed to have been
hurt by abortion and coerced into choosing it.361 The affidavits had already been
making the rounds in pro-life circles for several years, serving as the foundation for
an effort to relitigate Roe v. Wade, and forming the factual basis for a 2006 attempt
in South Dakota to ban abortion outright.362
Gonzales drew heavily on these arguments in upholding the federal statute, all
the while describing fetal life in terms that far more closely matched pro-lifers’
assertions.363 The Court applied Casey’s undue-burden test to the law, identifying
several purposes that supported it, including “express[ing] respect for the dignity of
human life,” preserving the reputation of the medical profession, and protecting
women from post-abortion regret.364 “It is self-evident,” the majority wrote, “that a
mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must struggle with grief more an-
guished and sorrow more profound when she learns, only after the event, what she
once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-
developing brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the human form.”365
Gonzales further concluded that the ban did not have an impermissible effect.366
Those challenging the law had stressed that it made no exception for situations in
which intact dilation-and-evacuation (D&E) abortions were necessary to protect
women’s health.367 Emphasizing conflicting views about whether D&E was ever
needed to protect women, the Court held that Congress had the freedom to act, and
a facial challenge to the statute had to fail.368
Gonzales opened new opportunities for the pro-life movement; some saw
greater potential in arguments involving women’s health: “After adopting the mantra
that ‘abortion is safer than childbirth,’ the Justices have operated since Roe with the
assumption that . . . there are only risks from delaying an abortion,” wrote Clarke
Forsythe.369 He concluded that Gonzales had ushered in “a more even-handed exami-
nation of health considerations and health data.”370 Forsythe and his colleagues also
saw value in TRAP regulations that could be used to build on pro-life arguments
124 (No. 05-380) [hereinafter Brief of Sandra Cano]; Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, supra note
262, at 1642.
361 For the brief, see Brief of Sandra Cano, supra note 360, at 22–24. On the Court’s reliance
on the brief, see Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, supra note 262, at 1641–46.
362 See, e.g., Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, supra note 262, at 1641–46, 1642 n.8.
363 See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157–66.
364 Id. at 157–59.
365 Id. at 159–60.
366 See id. at 161–68.
367 See id. at 147, 161.
368 See id. at 161–67.
369 Clarke Forsythe, The Medical Assumption at the Foundation of Roe v. Wade & Its
Implications for Women’s Health, 29 ISSUES L. & MED. 183, 199 (2014).
370 Id. at 200.
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about women’s health.371 Forsythe and Kehr described these statutes as a means of
ensuring “effective protection for women’s physical and psychological health, not
merely the bargain-basement goal of stopping the worst practitioners.”372
Although Gonzales increased the draw of woman-protective arguments, the
Court’s decision also encouraged pro-lifers who wanted to pass more all-encompass-
ing and punitive laws.373 This push brought renewed attention to the issue of punish-
ing women.374 In some instances, feticide laws were applied far more broadly.375
Thirty-eight states already had in place laws authorizing homicide charges in the
unlawful death of an unborn child, though some did explicitly rule out the prosecu-
tion of a pregnant woman.376 Others left open whether women could be prosecuted
for a range of offenses, including homicide, assault, and child abuse.377
In 2009, the first test of the principle that women would not be prosecuted came
when a teenage girl in Utah asked a man to beat her to end her pregnancy.378 Her
boyfriend had apparently not wanted the pregnancy, and the girl was uncertain that
she could get a legal abortion.379 Prosecutors charged the girl with solicitation to
commit murder, but the charges were reduced when a judge concluded that murder
charges could not apply to a woman seeking to terminate her own pregnancy.380 The
Utah State Legislature responded by passing legislation explicitly authorizing homi-
cide charges in the cases of women who intentionally or knowingly caused the death
of an unborn child.381 Unless an abortion was performed by or under the supervision
of a physician, the law categorized most other procedures as a form of murder.382
Lawmakers took on the issue of punishing women partly because it had become
much easier for women to terminate their own pregnancies using abortion drugs.383
371 See generally Forsythe, supra note 350; Forsythe & Kehr, supra note 356.
372 Forsythe & Kehr, supra note 356, at 46.
373 See id.; Forsythe, supra note 350.
374 See Goldberg, supra note 258; see also Rowan, supra note 4, at 70–74.
375 See, e.g., H.B. 442, 61st Leg., 2016 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2016); see also Forsythe, supra
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376 See Fetal Homicide State Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 16, 2017), http://
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377 See id.
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379 See Goldberg, supra note 258; Edecio Martinez, Abortion Beating: Aaron Harrison
Sentenced for Trying to Cause Miscarriage with Fists, CBS NEWS (Oct. 28, 2009, 11:02
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382 See Utah H.B. 442; see also Rowan, supra note 4, at 71; Nina Liss-Schultz, She Was
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Mifeprex, or RU 486, first appeared in the late 1980s as an abortion drug.384 After
2000, physicians most often used RU 486 together with misoprostol, a drug that
could also terminate pregnancies when used on its own.385 Neither drug was avail-
able over-the-counter in the United States, but women seeking it out often managed
to purchase it either online or abroad.386
As more women got their hands on abortion medication, lawmakers and prose-
cutors cracked down on those who terminated their own pregnancies.387 In 2011,
Jennie Linn McCormack faced criminal charges under a 1972 law that made it
illegal for a woman to perform abortion on herself after McCormack terminated a
pregnancy using RU 486.388 McCormack might also have run afoul of a recently
passed state law barring any abortion after twenty weeks of pregnancy.389 A judge
ultimately dismissed the case against her, citing a lack of evidence, and the Ninth
Circuit ultimately struck down the disputed Idaho law.390
Just the same, McCormack was far from the last to face criminal charges for
inducing an abortion; in 2013, Jennifer Whalen faced criminal charges after purchas-
ing abortion pills for her daughter online.391 When she took her daughter to the
hospital for treatment for complications, hospital officials reported her.392 Whalen
eventually faced a nine- to eighteen-month sentence for providing an abortion without
384 See, e.g., CRITCHLOW, supra note 52, at 221; Lawrence D. Brown, The More Things
Stay the Same the More They Change: The Odd Interplay Between Government and Ideology
in the Recent Political History of the U.S. Health-Care System, in HISTORY AND HEALTH
POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: PUTTING THE PAST BACK IN 38 (Rosemary A. Stevens et al.
eds., 2006); Rowan, supra note 4, at 71.
385 See Rowan, supra note 4, at 71.
386 See id.; Becky Little, The Science Behind the “Abortion Pill,” SMITHSONIAN.COM
(June 23, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/health-medicine/science-behind-abortion
-pill-180963762/ [https://perma.cc/WT97-ZY26].
387 See Rowan, supra note 4, at 71–72.
388 See Kim Murphy, Idaho Woman’s Case Marks a Key Abortion Challenge, L.A. TIMES
(June 16, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/16/nation/la-na-idaho-abortion-20120617
[https://perma.cc/5Y5M-CKXN]; Jessica Robinson, Idaho Woman Arrested for Abortion Is
Uneasy Case for Both Sides, NPR (Apr. 9, 2012, 1:46 PM), https://www.npr.org/templates
/story/story.php?storyId=150312812 [https://perma.cc/9LLY-K5T2]; Mark Joseph Stern, A
Quiet Victory, SLATE (June 5, 2015, 1:19 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x
/doublex/2015/06/jennie_linn_mccormack_case_court_strikes_down_idaho_s_abortion_laws
.html [https://perma.cc/F32J-A5TH].
389 See Stern, supra note 388.
390 See id. For the Ninth Circuit’s decision, see McCormack v. Herzog, 788 F.3d 1017 (9th
Cir. 2015).
391 See Emily Bazelon, A Mother in Jail for Helping Her Daughter Have an Abortion,
N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 22, 2014), https://nyti.ms/2kUit3u; David DeKok, Pennsylvania
Mother Who Gave Daughter Abortion Pill Gets Prison, REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2014, 12:25 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-crime-pennsylvania-abortion-idUSKBN0H10IR
20140906 [https://perma.cc/X38P-E3XV].
392 See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 391.
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a license, dispensing drugs without a license, assault, and endangering the welfare
of a child.393
Two years later, Anna Yocca, a 31-year-old woman, was indicted for first-degree
attempted murder after she attempted to perform an abortion on herself using a coat
hanger in the bathtub.394 Yocca was twenty-four weeks pregnant, and she seriously
injured her child, who was born premature with lifelong damage to his lungs, eyes,
and heart.395 Authorities ultimately agreed to reduce the charges against Yocca to
aggravated assault.396
In the best known case, Purvi Patel was sentenced to twenty years in prison for
feticide and child neglect after attempting an abortion with drugs she purchased
online.397 Patel had arrived at the hospital claiming to have had a miscarriage and
placed the fetus in a dumpster.398 Attorneys later disputed the age and viability of the
fetus, with defense witnesses claiming the child could not breathe on its own and
prosecution witnesses claiming that the child had been born alive.399 Although doctors
found no trace of abortifacient drugs in Patel’s body, hospital employees suspected
that she had self-induced, and prosecutors later found text messages indicating that
she had purchased abortion-inducing drugs online after getting pregnant during an
affair with a co-worker.400 Not wanting to disclose the affair to her conservative
family, Patel allegedly decided to terminate the pregnancy.401 Prosecutors charged her
393 See, e.g., id.
394 See, e.g., Becca Andrews, Woman Charged with Attempted Murder for Coat-Hanger
Abortion Faces Reduced Charges, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 22, 2015, 7:39 PM), http://www
.motherjones.com/politics/2015/12/tenn-woman-charged-coat-hanger-abortion-case-reduced
-charge/ [https://perma.cc/3EYZ-EMXN]; Sarah Kaplan, Tenn. Woman Charged with Attempted
Murder for Failed Coat Hanger Abortion, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/12/14/tenn-woman-charged-with-attempted
-murder-for-failed-coat-hanger-abortion/?utm_term=.7be57fad11f0 [https://perma.cc/BP77
-T2V2]; Ed Pilkington, Woman Charged with Attempted Murder for Failed Self-Induced
Abortion, GUARDIAN (Dec. 15, 2015, 12:39 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news
/2015/dec/15/tennessee-woman-charged-attempted-murder-failed-self-induced-abortion
[https://perma.cc/9LSD-EQ5N].
395 See Kaplan, supra note 394.
396 See Andrews, supra note 394.
397 See Mehta, supra note 5; Paltrow, supra note 5; Redden, supra note 5.
398 See Mehta, supra note 5; Redden, supra note 5.
399 See Emily Bazelon, Purvi Patel Could Be Just the Beginning, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 1,
2015), https://nyti.ms/2k42jDC; Redden, supra note 5.
400 See Amanda Marcotte, Somehow, Indiana Managed to Convict a Woman of Both
“Feticide” and Child Neglect, SLATE (Apr. 2, 2015, 12:55 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs
/xx_factor/2015/04/02/purvi_patel_sentenced_to_30_years_for_child_neglect_and_feticide
_there_s.html [https://perma.cc/MS76-NKPQ]; see also Jennifer Chowdhury, Indiana Sen-
tences Purvi Patel to 20 Years for Feticide, NBC NEWS (Mar. 31, 2015, 9:39 AM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/indiana-has-now-charged-two-asian-american
-women-feticide-n332761 [https://perma.cc/X8TJ-Y6GZ].
401 See Chowdhury, supra note 400; Redden, supra note 5.
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with feticide for having an illegal abortion, as well as child neglect for effectively
killing the child after it had been born alive.402 Although a court overturned Patel’s
conviction on appeal, she originally had faced a twenty-year prison sentence.403
Although relatively few women faced prosecution for illegal abortion, pro-lifers
spoke out against some of the criminal charges that were filed.404 For example,
Marjorie Dannenfelser of the Susan B. Anthony List stressed that criminal prosecu-
tions for women were never acceptable: “Criminal sanctions . . . are appropriate for
abortionists, and not for women,” she concluded.405 For the most part, however, the
common ground that should be available to those on either side of the debate about
ending the punishment of women has yet to become visible. While sometimes de-
nouncing the prosecution of pregnant women, pro-lifers have not spoken out against
all attempts to criminalize women’s behavior during pregnancy or offered less puni-
tive solutions.406
Given the Court’s recent decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt and
the election of Donald Trump, the future of efforts to prosecute women for abortion
seems less clear than ever.407 Whole Woman’s Health struck down two key pieces
of woman-protective legislation.408 Based on a model law circulated by AUL, one
provision required any physicians performing an abortion to have admitting privi-
leges at a hospital within thirty miles.409 A second mandated that abortion clinics
comply with the regulations governing ambulatory surgical centers.410
AUL and its allies defended the law as a necessary protection of women’s health:
“The [vast majority] of all abortions in this State are performed in clinics devoted
primarily to providing abortions and family planning services,” stated the legislative
findings that AUL proposed for each law.411 “In most instances, the woman’s only
402 See Mehta, supra note 5; Redden, supra note 5.
403 See Judge Says Purvi Patel Should Be Freed Immediately After Feticide Conviction
Overturned, GUARDIAN (Aug. 31, 2016, 22:19 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/us
-news/2016/sep/01/purvi-patel-freed-immediately-feticide-conviction-overturned [https://
perma.cc/5Z7R-QBQ6]. On the decision overturning Patel’s conviction, see Patel v. State,
60 N.E.3d 1041 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
404 Robinson, supra note 388.
405 Id.
406 Cf. id.; Rowan, supra note 4.
407 See Berenson, supra note 1; Matt Flegenheimer & Michael Barbaro, Donald Trump
Is Elected President in Stunning Repudiation of the Establishment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9,
2016), https://nyti.ms/2k4lSJa.
408 See Domonoske, supra note 26.
409 See Dawn Porter, Abortion Providers in Places Like Texas Are Heroically Cou-
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actual contact with the abortion provider occurs simultaneously with the abortion
procedure, with little opportunity to ask questions about the procedure, potential com-
plications, and proper follow-up care.”412 Before quoting several Supreme Court opin-
ions on the importance of protecting women’s health, the findings further explained:
Abortion is an invasive, surgical procedure that can lead to numer-
ous and serious (both short- and long-term) medical complica-
tions. Potential complications for abortion include, among others,
bleeding, hemorrhage, infection, uterine perforation, uterine scar-
ring, blood clots, cervical tears, incomplete abortion (retained
tissue), failure to actually terminate the pregnancy, free fluid in
the abdomen, acute abdomen, organ damage, missed ectopic preg-
nancies, cardiac arrest, sepsis, respiratory arrest, reactions to anes-
thesia, fertility problems, emotional problems, and even death.413
After abortion providers challenged the law, Texas emphasized at trial the ways
that both provisions supposedly helped women.414 When the Supreme Court later
agreed to hear the case, pro-life groups celebrated.415 AUL called the case “the most
significant . . . before the Supreme Court in decades.”416 Charmaine Yoest, the former
president of AUL, presented Whole Woman’s Health as a potential vindication of the
woman-protective strategy that the movement had refined for decades: “After more
than four decades of the abortion industry’s recalcitrant opposition to meaningful over-
sight,” she stated, “the Supreme Court must unequivocally affirm that it meant what it
has said as far back as Roe: states may regulate abortion to protect a mother’s health.”417
But the Court struck down both parts of the challenged Texas law and showed
fresh skepticism about the woman-protective arguments on which the movement had
.aul.org/downloads/2015-Legislative-Guides/Abortion/Abortion_Providers_Admitting_Privi
leges_Act_-_2015_LG.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6R2-573T]; AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, WOMEN’S
HEALTH PROTECTION ACT (ABORTION CLINIC REGULATIONS): MODEL LEGISLATION & POLICY
GUIDE FOR THE 2013 LEGISLATIVE YEAR 6 (2012), http://www.aul.org/wp-content/uploads
/2012/11/Womens-Health-Protection-Act-Abortion-Clinic-Regulations-2013-LG.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4Q8X-U5AE] [hereinafter WOMEN’S HEALTH PROTECTION ACT].
412 WOMEN’S HEALTH PROTECTION ACT, supra note 411, at 6.
413 Id.
414 See Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 679–87 (W.D. Tex. 2014).
415 See Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 136 S. Ct. 499 (2015) (granting certiorari to the Fifth
Circuit in Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)); AUL
Represents State Legislators in Historic Supreme Court Case, Fights to Protect Health and
Safety Standards for Women Vulnerable to Abortion Industry Abuses, AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE
(Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.aul.org/2016/02/aul-represents-state-legislators-in-historic-supreme
-court-case-fights-to-protect-health-and-safety-standards-for-women-vulnerable-to-abortion
-industry-abuses/ [https://perma.cc/C98C-YSKV] [hereinafter AUL Represents State Legislators].
416 AUL Represents State Legislators, supra note 415.
417 Id.
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long relied.418 After concluding that the petitioners’ claim was not barred by res
judicata, the Court took up the proper application of the undue-burden test:
The first part of the Court of Appeals’ test may be read to imply
that a district court should not consider the existence or nonexis-
tence of medical benefits when considering whether a regulation
of abortion constitutes an undue burden. The rule announced in
Casey, however, requires that courts consider the burdens a law
imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws
confer.419
The Court made clear that courts retain the final decision as to when a law cre-
ates an undue burden and should weigh evidence on the subject independently rather
than accepting legislative judgments without question.420 The Court easily reconciled
this holding with Gonzales.421 Recognizing the weight Gonzales gave to Congress’s
findings on partial-birth abortion, the Court emphasized that the Texas legislature that
passed HB2 had made no findings at all.422 Moreover, as Whole Woman’s Health
framed it, Gonzales did not reach a conclusion solely on the basis of legislative
findings.423 Indeed, the ultimate decision about whether a law constituted an undue
burden should remain with a court focused on “the evidence in the record.”424
In applying the undue-burden standard, the Court found no evidence that either
provision of HB2 actually served its stated purpose of protecting women’s health.425
Citing peer-reviewed studies, proof in amicus briefs from medical organizations, and
expert testimony at trial, the Court also concluded that nothing in the record indi-
cated that women would be safer after HB2 than before.426
Woman-protective arguments appealed to abortion opponents convinced that
women suffered when they terminated their pregnancies, and since the 1990s, such
claims have taken on real strategic significance.427 As long as pro-lifers view these
claims as tactically crucial, efforts to punish women seem unlikely to take off.
However, Whole Woman’s Health seems likely to make woman-protective argu-
ments less compelling to abortion opponents. The Court did not spell out whether
courts should scrutinize fetal-protective laws as closely as they should laws like
418 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310–18 (2016).
419 Id. at 2309.
420 See id. at 2309–10.
421 See id.
422 See id. at 2310; see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 156–67 (2007) (giving
deference to Congressional findings on The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003).
423 See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310.
424 Id.
425 See id. at 2309–18.
426 See id.
427 See supra Sections III.A–B.
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Texas’s HB2.428 Indeed, Casey emphasized that Roe had underestimated the state’s
interest in protecting fetal life throughout pregnancy.429 Whole Woman’s Health did
nothing to disrupt this conclusion.430
Gonzales later suggested that states had an important interest in protecting fetal
dignity by prohibiting procedures that would diminish respect for human life and
undermine the reputation of the medical profession.431 The Whole Woman’s Health
Court stressed that Gonzales had correctly carried out the balancing required by the
undue-burden standard.432 It is reasonable to believe that lawmakers will have more
latitude passing laws designed to protect fetal life than they would in introducing
more woman-protective measures. In the aftermath of the Court’s decision, abortion
opponents have much less reason to emphasize the woman-protective arguments that
make calls to punish women so costly.
The anti-abortion laws introduced since Donald Trump’s election confirm that
movement members have taken new interest in fetal-protective laws; Texas became the
second state to introduce regulations governing the disposal of fetal remains, requiring
the cremation or burial of all remains unless a woman miscarried at home.433 Before a
federal court enjoined it, Indiana’s burial law applied even to women who miscarried
at home.434 On the campaign trail, Trump pledged to back a federal ban on abortion at
twenty weeks that movement members framed as a fetal-pain prevention measure.435
428 Cf. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2326 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
429 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871–73 (1992).
430 See generally Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. 2292.
431 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157–58 (2007).
432 Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309–10.
433 On Texas’s fetal-remains regulations, see, for example, Molly Redden, Texas Measure
Requiring Burial of Fetal Remains May Herald Wave of Similar Laws, GUARDIAN (Dec. 19,
2016, 9:00 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/19/texas-fetal-remains
-burial-cremation-law [https://perma.cc/4BAX-Q4GW]; Samantha Schmidt, After Months
of Controversy, Texas Will Require Aborted Fetuses to Be Cremated or Buried, WASH. POST
(Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/11/29/de
spite-months-of-outcry-texas-will-require-aborted-fetuses-to-be-cremated-or-buried
/?utm_term=.cbd81f72ec99 [https://perma.cc/S9PW-YZKN]; Liam Stack, Texas Will Require
Burial of Aborted Fetuses, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2jOA0t6.
434 See Emma Green, State-Mandated Mourning for Aborted Fetuses, ATLANTIC (May 14,
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ archive/2016/05/state-mandated-mourning-for
-aborted-fetuses/482688/ [https://perma.cc/VUR3-L8DY]; see also Stephanie Wang, Judge
Halts Indiana’s New Abortion Law, INDYSTAR (June 30, 2016, 1:09 PM), http://www.indy
star.com/story/news/politics/2016/06/30/judge-grants-preliminary-injunction-indiana-abor
tion-law /86556662 [https://perma.cc/XM4H-ZBMF].
435 For the promises that Trump made during the election, see Letter from Donald J.
Trump to Pro-Life Leader (Sept. 2016), https://www.sba-list.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09
/Trump-Letter-on-ProLife-Coalition.pdf [https://perma.cc/NK7W-9PPR]. For the law poten-
tially banning abortions after twenty weeks, see, for example, Pain-Capable Unborn Child
Protection Act, H.R. 36, 115th Cong. (2017).
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Since December 2016, Ohio and Kentucky became the most recent of more than a
dozen states to introduce such laws.436
To be sure, most fetal-protective laws do not authorize punishments for women.437
However, many on the books do not rule out such penalties, and the same may be
true of the new laws that legislators are introducing.438 Now that the anti-abortion
movement no longer relies so heavily on a woman-protective strategy, new safe-
guards are needed to ensure that both sides’ stated commitment to preventing the
punishment of women is more than empty words.
Part IV suggests several shared legal solutions that appeal to those committed
to not punishing women for abortion. First, even if a law criminalizes abortion under
certain circumstances, any such statute should explicitly exempt any woman seeking
to terminate her own pregnancy, even when a procedure is illegal. Second, those on
opposing sides should find common ground on laws intended to eliminate the reasons
women use drugs or have dangerous, illegal abortions.
IV. MAKING GOOD ON THE COMMITMENT NOT TO PUNISH WOMEN
In theory, the commitment not to punish women is one of the few things on which
those contesting the abortion wars agree.439 Nevertheless, in practice, a meaningful
number of women face punishment for actions taken during pregnancy.440 Recently,
states have punished more women for abortion itself.441 This Part begins by exploring
the rationale for laws punishing women for child abuse or feticide. Next, this Part
shows why it is unnecessary—and should be politically unappealing—for lawmakers
to single out women in this way. Finally, this Part lays out several alternatives that
should appeal to those with varying views on abortion.
436 On the Ohio law, see, for example, Jessie Balmert, Ohio Governor Vetoes ‘Heartbeat’
Abortion Bill, but Passes 20-Week Ban, USA TODAY (Dec. 13, 2016, 4:20 PM), http://www
.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2016/12/13/ohio-governor-vetoes-heartbeat-abortion
-bill-but-passes-20-week-ban/95389734/ [https://perma.cc/JS7B-3PP8]; Jason Slotkin, Ohio
Gov. Kasich Signs 20-Week Abortion Limit, Rejects ‘Heartbeat Bill,’ NPR (Dec. 13, 2016,
7:25 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/12/13/505457437/ohio-gov-kasich
-signs-20-week-abortion-limit-rejects-heartbeat-bill [https://perma.cc/YY4N-MTQA]. On
the Kentucky law, see, for example, Max Greenwood, Kentucky Lawmakers Pass 20-Week
Abortion Ban, THE HILL (Jan. 7, 2017, 5:09 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room
/news/313193-kentucky-lawmakers-pass-20-week-abortion-ban [https://perma.cc/S73M
-K2RK]; Bradford Richardson, Kentucky Becomes 19th State to Ban Abortions After 20 Weeks
Into Pregnancy, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com /news/2017
/jan/11/kentucky-becomes-19th-state-ban-abortion-after-20-/ [https://perma.cc/Y4QN-J8ZC].
437 Cf. Fetal Homicide State Laws, supra note 376 (listing fetal homicide laws by state).
438 See id.
439 See, e.g., Mehta, supra note 5; Rich, supra note 20 (quoting Clarke Forsythe as saying,
“[P]unishing women is not the answer.”).
440 See supra Section III.B.
441 See, e.g., Atima Omara, Punishing Women for Abortion, AM. PROSPECT (June 16, 2016),
http://prospect.org/article/punishing-women-abortion [https://perma.cc/26RS-X76V].
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A. The Justifications for Punishing Pregnant Women
In recent years, more pregnant women have faced criminal charges for conduct
during pregnancy.442 The first wave of prosecutions for drug use during pregnancy
came in the 1980s and 1990s, but since 2003, a wide variety of states have considered
whether to extend criminal penalties.443 In some instances, courts have interpreted
homicide, neglect, or abuse laws to cover drug use.444 For example, in 2003, Arizona
signed off on the manslaughter conviction of a woman whose newborn tested posi-
tive for crack cocaine and subsequently died.445 In Oklahoma, a woman was convicted
of second-degree murder following the stillbirth of a child exposed to methamphet-
amine.446 While the state considered and failed to pass a law treating drug use during
pregnancy as assault, prosecutors continue charging drug users with neglect.447
As early as 1997, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that “maternal acts en-
dangering or likely to endanger [a fetus]” counted as child abuse.448 More recently,
in 2003, the court upheld the conviction and twenty-year prison sentence of Regina
McKnight for murder by child abuse.449 In 2013 and 2014, the Alabama Supreme
442 See CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, PUNISHING WOMEN FOR THEIR BEHAVIOR DURING PREG-
NANCY: AN APPROACH THAT UNDERMINES WOMEN’S HEALTH AND CHILDREN’S INTERESTS
(2000), https://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/pub_bp
_punishingwomen.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HB8-ZGUC]. For further examples of women who
faced criminal liability for conduct during pregnancy, see Elizabeth L. Thompson, Note, The
Criminalization of Maternal Conduct During Pregnancy: A Decisionmaking Model for Law-
yers, 64 IND. L.J. 357 (1989); Coercive and Punitive Governmental Responses to Women’s
Conduct During Pregnancy, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/coercive-and-punitive-govern
mental-responses-womens-conduct-during-pregnancy [https://perma.cc/B9XP-JY8L] (last
visited Feb. 21, 2018); see also supra Section III.B.
443 See Georgatos, supra note 203; see also Christine Vestal & Elizabeth Wilkerson, States
Expand Fetal Homicide Laws, ALTERNET (Aug. 28, 2006, 7:00 PM), https://www.alternet
.org/story/40676/states_expand_fetal_homicide_laws [https://perma.cc/LG3E-X5W7] (describing
trends in fetal homicide laws since the 1970s, and recent developments); Personhood, REWIRE
(Jan. 6, 2017), https://rewire.news/legislative-tracker/law-topic/personhood/ [https://perma
.cc/ZKV7-6HMV] (listing recently introduced “personhood” legislation); supra Section III.B.
444 See, e.g., Leticia Miranda et al., How States Handle Drug Use During Pregnancy,
PROPUBLICA (Sept. 30, 2015), https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/maternity-drug-poli
cies-by-state [https://perma.cc/D7AV-943Z] (listing explicit or implied judicial approval of
such punishments in Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas).
445 See, e.g., id.
446 See, e.g., id.
447 See id.; see also Oklahoma Bill Regarding Pregnant Women and Substance Abuse (SB
559), REWIRE, https://rewire.news/legislative-tracker/law/oklahoma-bill-regarding-pregnant
-women-and-substance-abuse-sb-559/ [https://perma.cc/NR3E-29AR] (last updated Apr. 24,
2015).
448 Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 779 (S.C. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1145 (1998).
449 See State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 171–73 (S.C. 2003) (upholding conviction
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Court concluded that prosecutors can charge pregnant drug users with a form of child
endangerment, and in 2014, Tennessee passed a statute openly allowing prosecutions
for fetal assault if a child is born addicted to or harmed by drugs.450
More women also seem likely to face prosecution for terminating their own preg-
nancies. Although only a handful of women have thus far faced charges,451 many state
laws hold open the possibility of similar prosecutions.452 Thirty-eight states make
feticide a crime, and twenty-three reach the death of an unborn child from concep-
tion onward.453 While excusing anyone performing a legal abortion, several state
laws say nothing about women who self-induce abortion or do so at times or in ways
that run afoul of state law.454 With the spread of abortion drugs and the rising number
of restrictions on access to abortions performed by doctors, it seems likely that more
women will face prison time for having illegal abortions.455
Recent fetal abuse and feticide laws share several justifications that deserve
examination. First, in both cases, supporters of criminal charges emphasize that
prosecutors target only women who intentionally harm their unborn children.456 For
example, after the state charged her with homicide by child abuse, Regina McKnight
argued on appeal that she lacked the requisite intent for the crime.457 She argued that
she had not known that her drug use would lead to a stillbirth.458
The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected this argument, reasoning that any
illegal drug user demonstrated extreme indifference toward her unborn children.459
“Given the fact that it is public knowledge that usage of cocaine is potentially fatal,”
the court reasoned, “we find the fact that McKnight took cocaine knowing she was
where defendant’s stillborn 34–37-week gestational age fetus tested positive for metabolites
of cocaine), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 819 (2003).
450 See Laura Bassett, Tennessee Enacts Law to Incarcerate Pregnant Women Who Use
Drugs, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 30, 2014, 3:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014
/04/30/tennessee-to-incarcerate-_n_5241770.html [https://perma.cc/F3H5-VR3A]; Nina
Martin, This Law Is Supposed to Protect Babies, but It’s Putting Their Moms Behind Bars,
MOTHER JONES (Sept. 23, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/09
/alabama-chemical-endangerment-drug-war/ [https://perma.cc/6AZ8-64J4].
451 See generally Rowan, supra note 4; discussion supra Section III.B.
452 See Fetal Homicide State Laws, supra note 376.
453 See id.
454 See, e.g., id.
455 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.150, 11.81.250, 12.55.035–125 (2017); ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 5-61-101, 5-61-102 (2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 691 (2017); see also Fetal Homicide
State Laws, supra note 376.
456 See, e.g., Sarah Netter, Utah Abortion Bill: Punishing Miscarriages or Preventing
Crime?, ABC NEWS (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.abcnews.go.com/health/utah-abortion-bill
-punishing-miscarriages-preventing-crime/story?id=9955517 [https://perma.cc/Q28D-72G2]
(bill’s sponsor arguing bill only targets reckless behavior constituting an unjustifiable risk).
457 See State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 172–73 (S.C. 2003).
458 See id. at 173.
459 See id.
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pregnant was sufficient evidence to submit to the jury on whether she acted with
extreme indifference to her child’s life.”460
The court’s conclusion tracked arguments made by pro-lifers in the 1980s and
1990s about the distinction between pregnant drug users and other women who may
inadvertently miscarry.461 Pregnant drug users were on notice about the risks posed
by their conduct both because of criminal laws on the subject and because of public
knowledge about the impact of certain narcotics on the fetus.462 Lawmakers claim
to punish women in only extreme cases, when women do something unsafe, illegal,
and deliberately wrong.463 For example, Utah zeroes in on intentional or knowing
acts leading to fetal harm and exempts abortions only when “carried out by a physi-
cian or . . . under the direction of a physician.”464
The justification for these laws lies partly in the relative infrequency with which
women are punished, at least up to this point; lawmakers and activists claim to
punish only those whose acts are intentional, dangerous, and illegal.465 As this Part
shows next, however, these justifications do not stand up to close examination.
B. The Futility of Punishing Pregnant Women
As the chief sponsor of the Utah law admitted, efforts to punish pregnant women
serve to restrict access to abortion.466 Movement members promote these laws partly
to limit access to abortion.467 At the same time, these laws theoretically make sense
because they single out “the worst of the worst,” those who act with the most aware-
ness of their conduct and violate more than one criminal statute. Targeting these
women could deter others from having unsafe, illegal abortions or abusing drugs.
In practice, however, criminal laws are likely to encourage riskier conduct. Empha-
sizing intentional or reckless conduct makes little sense when women have few real
alternatives, particularly, the poor, non-white women who disproportionately face
penalties for conduct during pregnancy.468 An ever-expanding array of abortion
restrictions has put legal abortions out of reach for some women.469 Drug treatment
460 Id.
461 See discussion supra Section II.B.
462 See, e.g., McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 173, 175–76.
463 See Netter, supra note 456.
464 H.B. 442, 61st Leg., 2016 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2016).
465 See Netter, supra note 456.
466 See id.
467 See id.
468 On poor women of color facing more prosecutions for conduct during pregnancy, see,
for example, Deborah L. Rhode, The Terrible War on Pregnant Drug Users, NEW REPUBLIC
(July 17, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/118681/law-protect-fetuses-actually-pun
ishes-minority-women [https://perma.cc/2DLL-AC6M].
469 On the impact of restrictions on abortion access, see, e.g., MATTHEW E. WETSTEIN,
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programs tailored for the needs of pregnant or parenting women are underfunded,
overburdened, and inaccessible.470 Women who fail to avail themselves of better op-
tions often do so because those choices are practically, if not formally, unavailable.471
Nor will such laws be effective in deterring women from harming their children
or themselves. Women aware of criminal penalties might not seek out drug addic-
tion treatment or necessary medical care after self-inducing abortion for fear of get-
ting caught, leading to negative outcomes for women and their children.472 Pregnant
or parenting women in prison rarely have access to effective treatment, but they can
often get drugs that fuel an addiction.473 Furthermore, by not addressing the underly-
ing causes of fetal harms—a lack of access to safe, legal abortion or effective drug
treatment programs for pregnant women—these laws simply stigmatize women’s
decisions without likely changing their behavior.
Such prosecutions also seem politically risky, even for activists and politicians
seeking to restrict abortion as much as possible. As activists realized in the early
1990s, their movement lost ground when voters viewed abortion opponents as moral
absolutists, indifferent to the well-being of women.474 To address this image problem,
pro-lifers began highlighting women coerced or manipulated into choosing abortion.475
(1996); Lawrence B. Finer & Mia R. Zolna, Declines in Unintended Pregnancy in the United
States, 2008–2011, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 843, 843–52 (2016); Joseph Neiman et al., The
Effect of Restrictions in Abortion Access on Overall Abortion Rate, U. NEV. SCH. MED.,
http://www2.medicine.nevada.edu/medlib/posters/2015-student-posters/neiman.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WD6D-P3SS] (last visited Feb. 21, 2018); see also Rhode, supra note 468.
470 See, e.g., AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMM. ON HEALTH CARE
FOR UNDERSERVED WOMEN, COMMITTEE OPINION NO. 473, SUBSTANCE ABUSE REPORTING




471 See id.; Neiman et al., supra note 469.
472 See AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMM. ON ETHICS, COMMITTEE
OPINION NO. 664, REFUSAL OF MEDICALLY RECOMMENDED TREATMENT DURING PREG-
NANCY (2016), https://www.acog.org/Clinical-Guidance-and-Publications/Committee-Opin
ions/Committee-on-Ethics/Refusal-of-Medically-Recommended-Treatment-During-Pregnancy
[https://perma.cc/25VH-74VK]; Board of Trustees, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy:
Court-Ordered Medical Treatments and Legal Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behavior
by Pregnant Women, 264 JAMA 2663, 2667 (1990) (“Pregnant women will be likely to
avoid seeking prenatal or other medical care for fear that their physicians’ knowledge of
substance abuse or other potentially harmful behavior could result in a jail sentence rather
than proper medical treatment.”).
473 See, e.g., CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, supra note 442, at 8.
474 See discussion supra Section III.A. See generally Jensen, supra note 12.
475 See Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, supra note 262, at 1687 (“Women who seek abortions
must have been confused, misled, or coerced into the decision to abort a pregnancy—because
the choice to abort a pregnancy cannot reflect a normal woman’s true desires or interests.”).
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These arguments angered supporters of legal abortion, many of whom saw woman-
protective arguments as sexist generalizations that might, under some circumstances,
violate the Equal Protection Clause.476 At the same time, anti-abortion, woman-
protective arguments resonate politically because they soften the image of pro-lifers
and shift blame for difficult pregnancies from women to their partners, families, or
society as a whole.477 For these arguments to carry any political weight, however, they
need to match the legal reality in most states. Signing off on or promoting prosecu-
tions of any pregnant woman undermines woman-protective arguments and makes
them seem hollow.
Next, this Part turns to some alternatives that should attract support from those
with clashing views on abortion. First, at a minimum, states should amend feticide
laws to exempt women who have terminated their pregnancies, regardless of whether
they have done so legally. If those on both sides agree that women should not be pun-
ished for abortion, then activists should ensure that the law does not allow punish-
ment, regardless of when or how they terminate their pregnancies. Second, in dealing
with fetal mistreatment, states should introduce laws reducing the risk of fetal harm
rather than penalizing women when it is too late to make a difference. By introducing
laws of this kind, lawmakers can show that the pro-life commitment not to punish
pregnant women for fetal harm is more than an empty promise.
C. Alternatives to Punishment
Like statutes on assault, neglect, or abuse of an unborn child, feticide laws
generally applied to third parties who harmed pregnant women and their children.478
Only recently have statutes been applied to women terminating their own pregnan-
cies.479 States should clarify that these laws never authorize the prosecution of preg-
nant women. Many states exempt all pre-viability procedures to which a pregnant
woman has consented, thereby reaching all non-coerced abortions (whether legal or
illegal).480 Such a reform would avoid the potential constitutional problems with laws
that are less clear. Ambiguous laws applied to pregnant women raise procedural and
476 See, e.g., Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion
Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 225–28 (2009); Siegel, The New Poli-
tics, supra note 257, at 991–94; Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and Minds
of Abortion Discourse, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1196 (2010); see also Jensen, supra note 12.
477 Cf. Siegel, The New Politics, supra note 257, at 992–93; see also Jensen, supra note
12, at 1–7.
478 See, e.g., Paltrow, supra note 5; see also Fetal Homicide State Laws, supra note 376
(listing some states where acts committed to the mother are included, but acts say the mother
are excluded).
479 See, e.g., Paltrow, supra note 5; see also discussion supra Section IV.A.
480 See Fetal Homicide State Laws, supra note 376.
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substantive due process concerns.481 If a statute does not spell out that women can
be prosecuted for terminating a pregnancy, they may not have constitutionally ade-
quate notice that their conduct could be criminal.482 Moreover, by putting more obsta-
cles in the path of a pregnant woman, such laws could constitute an undue burden
under Casey.483
Constitutional questions aside, those with varying views on abortion should see
the wisdom of clearly exempting women from criminal prosecution. As an initial
matter, by explicitly protecting women from prosecution, the law would encourage
women who seek out dangerous, illegal, or self-induced abortions to seek attention
if they suffer complications. Pro-life and pro-choice activists claim to care about
women’s health, and ensuring that abortion laws advance that interest should appeal
to those with different opinions on abortion. At the same time, if criminal penalties
are not in place, drug-addicted women are more likely to seek out prenatal care.484
Research establishes that the children of addicted women who receive treatment
during pregnancy have far better outcomes after birth.485
Those on opposing sides of the abortion question should also endorse laws that
eliminate some of the conditions that push women to endanger themselves or inad-
vertently harm unborn children. Most obviously, lawmakers should fund more
effective drug-treatment programs designed to serve the needs of pregnant and parent-
ing women. The need for this alternative has become especially apparent. The Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services has warned that the nation is suffering from an
opioid epidemic.486 Deaths from abuse of prescription drugs is on the rise, and forty-
four Americans die daily as the result of an overdose.487 Heroin deaths have also
increased sharply, quadrupling between 1999 and 2013.488 The Department has also
suggested that an addiction to prescription drugs represents a great risk factor for a
subsequent heroin problem.489
481 See What’s Wrong with Fetal Rights, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/whats-wrong
-fetal-rights [https://perma.cc/E7YF-Z3DA] (last visited Feb. 21, 2018).
482 See CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, supra note 442, at 3 (discussing the concern of
some courts that prosecutions violate due process rights).
483 See discussion supra Section III.B (explaining the undue-burden analysis in recent case
law).
484 See, e.g., CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, supra note 442, at 4.
485 See, e.g., id. at 7.
486 See, e.g., About the Epidemic: The U.S. Opioid Epidemic, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/opioids/about-the-epidemic/index.html [https://perma.cc/TFR9
-UYLR] (last visited Feb. 21, 2018) [hereinafter About the Epidemic]; AM. SOC’Y OF ADDIC-
TION MED., OPIOID ADDICTION: 2016 FACTS AND FIGURES, http://www.asam.org/docs/default
-source/advocacy/opioid-addiction-disease-facts-figures.pdf [https://perma.cc/QC5B-Y5AJ]
(last visited Feb. 21, 2018).
487 See, e.g., About the Epidemic, supra note 486.
488 See, e.g., id.
489 See, e.g., id.
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To address the risk of drug use by pregnant women, states should adopt pro-
grams that have proven effective in addition to those targeted for growing opioid use.
In-patient treatment programs have a track record of helping pregnant and parenting
women addicted to drugs, and more state laws should create and fund them.490 When
it comes to opioid addiction, state laws should mandate training for physicians
prescribing drugs likely to create a high risk of addiction.491 A federal executive order
signed in October 2015 should serve as a model for programs in the states.492 State
laws should also expand access to medication-assisted treatment, a protocol involv-
ing access to certain prescriptions, counseling, and behavior modification therapy
that has proven especially useful for those addicted to opioids.493
Pro-life and pro-choice activists should also support laws eliminating some of
the underlying reasons women resort to illegal abortions or drug use. Some studies
have found that nearly 40% of women seeking an abortion report that they do so
because of domestic violence,494 and research has also suggested a strong connection
exists between drug abuse and the violence experienced by women, both as children
and adults.495 Poverty also contributes to poor outcomes for children at least as much
as drug use.496 Almost 18% of pregnant women drink alcohol during early pregnancy,
and 10% of women admitted to smoking in the last three months of pregnancy.497
490 See, e.g., CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, supra note 442.
491 On recommendations for mandatory opioid training, see Thomas M. Burton, FDA
Panel Urges Mandatory Opioid Training for Doctors, WALL ST. J. (May 4, 2016, 7:39 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/fda-panel-urges-mandatory-opioid-training-for-doctors
-1462405146 [https://perma.cc/T6NV-2EAF]; see also Opinion, Should Opioid Training for
Doctors Be Mandatory?, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate
/2016/05/05/should-opioid-training-for-doctors-be-mandatory.
492 See Memorandum on Addressing Prescription Drug Abuse and Heroin Use, 2015 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press
-office/2015/10/21/presidential-memorandum-addressing-prescription-drug-abuse-and-heroin
[https://perma.cc/JY79-R7EJ].
493 See, e.g., id.; see also NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, MISUSE OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
26–29, https://d14rmgtrwzf5a.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/2609-misuse-of-prescription
-drugs.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9GU-TLRB] (last updated Jan. 2018) (explaining there are mul-
tiple options for treatment of prescription opioid addiction).
494 On the prevalence of domestic violence among women seeking abortion in the United
States, see, for example, Susan S. Glander et al., The Prevalence of Domestic Violence Among
Women Seeking Abortion, 91 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1002, 1002–05 (1998).
495 See Hortensia Amaro et al., Violence During Pregnancy and Substance Use, 80 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 575, 578 (1990); Teri Randall, Domestic Violence Begets Other Problems
of Which Physicians Must Be Aware to Be Effective, 264 JAMA 940, 943 (1990).
496 See Neiman et al., supra note 469.
497 On the percentage of women who smoke in the last three months of pregnancy, see, e.g.,
Tobacco Use and Pregnancy, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc
.gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/tobaccousepregnancy/ [https://perma.cc/8RSZ
-EG76] (last visited Feb. 21, 2018). On alcohol use among pregnant women, see SUBSTANCE
ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., 18 PERCENT OF PREGNANT WOMEN DRINK
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Like nutritional deficiencies, drug and alcohol use can stunt fetal development, and
yet punitive laws do not cover them.498 A logical solution for pregnant women
would not single out women who violate the law while ignoring the concrete effect
of that behavior on a child. Preventing, rather penalizing, misconduct best promises
to improve outcomes for women and children.
Those genuinely interested in achieving good outcomes for pregnant women and
children should support strong state and federal domestic violence laws, including
enhanced criminal penalties and robust injunctive relief. Those who disagree on
abortion should also see the need for targeted programs for poor women, including
those improving the diagnosis of drug addiction in pregnant women and ensuring
access to education and prenatal care.
Even states with severe budget constraints can do more to enforce existing laws
and fill slots in programs already created by law. States should introduce legislation
barring discrimination against pregnant women in the administration of existing,
publicly funded drug treatment programs or follow the lead of legislators who have
mandated that pregnant women be given priority access to already-funded programs.
These alternatives should attract the support of activists sincerely interested in
protecting women and their children. As a practical matter, addressing the root causes
of drug addiction and self-induced abortion promises to do much more to eliminate
fetal harm than laws discouraging women from seeking help. As importantly, laws
actually recognizing that women can be victims—of domestic violence, of poverty,
and of other conditions beyond their control—lends credibility to arguments about
the importance of protecting women. Those authentically interested in helping women
should do more than restrict abortion.
CONCLUSION
Would women be punished if abortion were once again criminalized? Recent
events have made this question far more than a matter of speculation. Between the
backlash that greeted Donald Trump’s comments on punishing women and a visible
increase in prosecutions of pregnant women, scholars, lawyers, and politicians have
debated the aims of the pro-life movement and the potential that women would face
punishment if abortion were once again a crime.
ALCOHOL DURING EARLY PREGNANCY (2013), http://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default
/files/spot123-pregnancy-alcohol-2013/spot123-pregnancy-alcohol-2013.pdf [https://perma
.cc/FFX4-L8XU].
498 See, e.g., CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, supra note 442. For studies showing the severe
impact of malnutrition on fetal development, see Caroline HD Fall, Fetal Malnutrition and
Long-Term Outcomes, 74 NESTLE NUTRITION INST. WORKSHOP SERIES 11 (2013); Peter J.
Morgane et al., Prenatal Malnutrition and Development of the Brain, 17 NEUROSCIENCE &
BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 91 (1993); see also, e.g., Fetal Homicide State Laws, supra note 376;
Miranda et al., supra note 444.
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In spite of interest in the question, there is a gap in the historical scholarship:
while researchers have studied the law and politics of illegal abortion before 1973,
we lack an understanding of the goals and strategies of pro-life legal reformers after
Roe involving the punishment of women. This Article begins to bridge this gap.
In the years immediately after Roe, pro-lifers did not officially endorse the pun-
ishment of women.499 However, the movement did not foreclose the possibility of
penalizing women if doing so would provide the unborn with more protection.500
Over the course of the 1980s, the idea of punishing women came to the forefront of
the debate.501 Pro-lifers gradually developed a new focus on protecting women from
the harms associated with abortion.502 Tied to the rise of crisis pregnancy centers,
these arguments helped the movement dispel rumors that it harbored only lawbreak-
ers indifferent to women’s plight.503 Woman-protective arguments also appealed to
movement members seeking to undermine what they saw as the best argument for
the other side.504
At the same time, as activists sought to strengthen restrictions of abortion, they
looked to introduce laws that recognized fetal personhood in other contexts.505 Move-
ment members pushed for feticide and child abuse laws, some of which applied to
pregnant drug users.506 Over time, movement leaders even signed off on laws per-
mitting prosecutions of women for terminating their pregnancies.507
Over the course of several decades, a contradiction appeared in the movement’s
position on punishing (or protecting) women. While pro-lifers invested more and
more in the protection of women, movement members did not consistently treat
them as victims rather than perpetrators.508 Indeed, movement members justified
certain prosecutions of pregnant women whose conduct qualified as selfish, mali-
cious, intentional, or illegal.509
To resolve this contradiction, those on either side of the abortion debate should
seek out legal solutions that reduce the risk that women will have dangerous illegal
abortions or use drugs. Protecting women is more than a catchphrase. Those who
have purported to care about the well-being of women can do better than punishing
women for abortion.
499 See Ziegler, supra note 8.
500 See id.
501 See id.
502 See id.; see also discussion supra Sections II.B–III.A.
503 See Willke, Never the Mother, supra note 13; Ziegler, supra note 8.
504 See Ziegler, supra note 8. See generally Jensen, supra note 12.
505 See discussion supra Sections II.A–IV.A.
506 See, e.g., Netter, supra note 456; Paltrow, supra note 5.
507 See, e.g., Netter, supra note 456.
508 Compare Georgatos, supra note 203, with Jensen, supra note 12, and Willke, Never
the Mother, supra note 13.
509 See Rich, supra note 20.
